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ABSTRACT 
 
ASYMMETRICAL DETERRENCE FOR NBC TERRORISM 
Ece, Berk 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu 
 
September 2004 
 
 
 
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the framework of deterrence 
theory whether it may be suited to the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) 
terrorism as an asymmetrical threat. As a methodology, mainly qualitative 
means were applied. This thesis will argue that though the classical deterrence 
theory was primarily created for inter-state relations, its main premises and 
newly transformed features –due to the post-cold war era- can be applied on the 
asymmetrical relations between states and terrorist organizations which would 
initiate to use NBC material in particular. In the analysis of the problem of 
managing asymmetrical deterrence through revisiting orthodox ground of 
deterrence; the nature of the new threat and critics of classical theory of 
deterrence were discussed together to shape a unique asymmetrical deterrence. 
In conclusion, this thesis was finalized with the argument that to overcome the 
deficiencies of prevention models against asymmetrical threats as well as to 
remove obstacles for conducting a feasible deterrence theory against 
asymmetrical threats; benefiting from the deconstruction of classical deterrence 
 iv 
theory is necessary in terms of recalling the concepts of rationality, capability 
and credibility.  
 v 
ÖZET 
 
NBC TERÖRÖİZMİ İÇİN ASİMETRİK CAYDIRICILIK 
Ece, Berk 
Master, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu 
 
Eylül 2004 
 
 
 
Bu tezin amacı caydırıcılık kuramının, asimetrik bir tehdit türü olarak 
Nükleer, Biyolojik ve Kimyasal (NBC) terörizm olgusu çerçevesinde 
uygulanabilirliğini çözümlemektir. Yöntem olarak ağırlıkla kalitatif araçlardan 
yararlanılmıştır. Tezde, klasik caydırıcılık kuramının devletler arası ilişkiler 
bağlamında ortaya çıkmasına rağmen temel dayanaklarının ve soğuk savaş 
ertesi değişen yeni unsurlarının özellikle NBC terörizmini hedefleyen örgütler 
ile devletler arasındaki asimetrik ilişkiye uygulanabilir olup olmadığı 
savunulmaktadır. Caydırıcılığın ortodoks temelini tekrar irdeleyerek asimetrik 
caydırıcılığı uygulanabilir hale getirebilme sorunsalının çözümünde, özgün bir 
kuram şekillendirebilmek için klasik caydırıcılık kuramının eleştirileri ile 
ortaya çıkan yeni tehdidin doğası birlikte ele alınmıştır. Sonuç olarak bu tez, 
asimetrik tehditlere karşı ileri sürülen önleme modellerinin eksikliklerini ve bu 
tehditlere karşı ugulanabilir bir caydırıcılık kuramının önündeki engelleri 
ortadan kaldırabilmek için klasik caydırıcılık kuramının, rasyonalite, 
güvenilirlik ve yetenekler temelinde bir yapıbozumunun gerektiği savı ile 
noktalanmıştır.   
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CHAPTER – I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
As introductory remarks, a deterrent strategy can rely on one or both 
of two mechanisms. First, it can be based on threats to visit punishment on an 
enemy that significantly outweighs the gain of a particular course of action. 
This approach is traditionally viewed as targeting civilian assets and constituted 
the basis of the Cold War concept of mutual assured destruction. Another 
approach is based on the concept of denial. Specific capabilities deter enemies 
from pursuing either a given objective or a conflict strategy. This is achieved 
by undermining their ability, or belief in their ability, to realize a desired 
outcome. Deterrent strategies can include both punishment and denial 
mechanisms. For example, the United States appears to favor such an approach 
to deter unconventional weapons usage by a regime by combining denial 
capabilities like missile defenses with the threat of punishment. That is why 
this thesis will discuss the involvement of both to deter asymmetrical threats. 
 
A credible deterrent posture requires the capability to deliver on the 
deterrent message, or at least the appearance of it. The deterrer must 
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demonstrate the intent and resolve to fulfill the message and effectively 
communicate this to an enemy, including which lines not to cross. That is why 
this thesis will concentrate its efforts of credible capabilities and indirect 
deterrence through show of strength.   
 
Deterrence also assumes that a target will be a cost-benefit 
calculator—a rational actor who evaluates options in terms of costs and 
benefits, including likely responses. But what is accepted as rational by one 
actor may not appear rational to another because of cultural factors or decision-
making processes. This is a major consideration in the war on terrorism 
because of the asymmetric nature of the opposing sides in almost every respect. 
A preventive strategy in this context—deterrent requires knowing enemy 
motives, worldview, resolve, capabilities (including conflict strategies and 
techniques), and vulnerabilities. That s why this thesis will imply and attempt 
to apply “relative rationality” while shaping asymmetrical deterrence. 
 
Measuring the failure of deterrence is straightforward because the 
action that the deterring party seeks to avoid occurs. However, measuring 
success is more difficult, as it cannot be proven that the strategy was pivotal, 
marginal, or irrelevant to why an enemy opted not to act. This can be 
significant when attempting to prevent mass-casualty terrorism. That is why 
this thesis will prefer to sample the cases without categorizing them in terms of 
success or failure.  
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Since deterrence is about preventing an enemy from acting in a 
particular way, success will depend on a target believing, or being made to 
believe, that the current state of affairs is preferable to the cost associated with 
a particular course of action, at least in the short term, if the purpose is buying 
time for other approaches. It follows that if an enemy is determined to act, 
deterrence could prove unworkable. That is why this thesis will exert its efforts 
in favor of state parties to find ways for persuading stateless ones. 
 
To introduce the my argument mainly, indeed it is firstly accepted that 
even though terrorists may use irrational means for conducting terrorist action, 
their ends, organizational structures and legitimacy concerns would be rational 
based on political objectives. (Even Aum cult tended to defect the U.S. 
presence from Japan homeland1). Thus, if they assume rationality to some 
extend, they can be deterred, at least to some extend. Therefore, detailed 
perception of threat capabilities that terrorists posses; deeply understanding of 
their decision-making process; announced threat of punishments for specified 
targets on the basis of vulnerabilities that terrorists and their (in)direct 
supporters - if there is-, indicate; and   lastly, the influence of international 
community that implies low politics of global affairs as well as complete 
transparency and information accuracy should be managed by states to manage 
asymmetrical threats through Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) 
weapons.  
                                                 
1 The correlation between rational ends and irrational means –which in fact defines the core of 
the asymmetricism- can be clearly seen in the case of Aum cult. For instance, even after 
Matsumoto attack, Japan intelligence resources had known that anti-American rhetoric of the 
cult and its goals for abandoning the US bases in Japan. For example, Aum had tried to attack 
two of them with Botolium toxin according to intelligence reports. For detailed information see 
Brad Roberts; “ Bioterrorism: Calibrating Threats and Responses Issues & Insights”; Vol. 3; 
No. 3; May 2003. 
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To sum up, in this thesis, I will ultimately aim at attempting to 
conceptualize post-cold war deterrence framework as well as threats involving 
stateless actors and NBC weapons in order to theorize the asymmetrical 
deterrence.   
 
In the first chapter I will attempt to define asymmetrical threats and 
their general features. In the second chapter, I will focus on NBC terrorism as 
an asymmetrical threat and try to conceptualize its impacts on the international 
politics. Later, I will emphasize three distinct characteristics as key points of 
implementing asymmetrical deterrence: One is the debate, mentioned in the 
third chapter, on the differences of Cold War and post-Cold War, particularly 
post 9/11 era in terms of conceptualization of deterrence.  Other is the impact 
on rationality being discussed due to the so-called irrational structures of 
terrorist organizations probably because of being stateless actors. The last one 
is the applicability of deterrence for asymmetrical actors on the basis of 
creating credible capabilities. Those regarding rationality and applicability 
forms the fourth chapter titled as shaping asymmetrical deterrence.   
 
As methodology, I will mainly benefit from unclassified literature. As 
it is extremely difficult to penetrate classified information on the issue, I will 
try to make all conceptualizations in a flexible, debatable and a critical manner. 
As sampling may arguments I will generally use publicized open-resources. In 
addition, I will rarely apply statistical data for shaping my hypothesis. 
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CHAPTER - II 
 
 
THE CONTEXT OF ASYMMETRICAL THREATS 
 
 
 
The ultimate beginning of searching a framework for asymmetrical 
deterrence must be commenced by a feedback of history and its cases. Before 
starting to conceptualize asymmetricism, it is necessary to explain that the term 
like all other terms in the field, has roots in the historical experiences of 
particular units in specific levels. Although this paper tried to depend on 
various definitions of different origins; it becomes inevitable to emphasize on 
unique actors’ diagnosis as avant -guards . Therefore, American scholars, 
military officers and researchers are the ones who have been producing the 
overwhelming part of the literature in regard to asymmetricism. As a result, in 
forming the operational definition of asymmetricism, a U.S. originated 
accounts in terms of nationalities of authors might be seen. However the 
existence of debatable arguments among them and contributions of few but 
noteworthy non-American resources prevents the paper from being pro-
American. 
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2.1- Historical Retrospect: 
 
In the discipline of the international relations, one of the most 
important determinant factor of theorizing, forming and conducting politics is 
threat perception. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, bipolarity2 of the 
international politics lost its legitimacy in terms of determining and 
characterizing the threat environment. In the post-cold war era, the origins of 
the security issues have been transforming towards multidimensional and 
multilateral features. Moreover, different and challenging threats of the era has 
been producing an uncertainty which is considered as principal root of the 
destabilization of the international politics3  
 
In the post-bipolar era, asymmetrical perceptions of security 
community have started to replace with pre-defined bilateral security issues 
based on symmetrical relations. Symmetrical relations can be defined as 
balanced and proportional similarity among ends, means and quality of the 
                                                 
2 Polarity here refers to the number of great powers in a given international system in terms of 
the degree in which the states are organized into competing blocs, or the concentration of 
capabilities, the relative power shares maintained by the system’s greater and lesser powers. 
For more details, see Waltz, Kenneth; Theory of International Politics ; (New York: Random 
House, 1979). Kaplan, Morton A.; Variants on Six Models of the International System ; (New 
York: MacMillian Press, 1995) and Mansfield, Edward D.; Power, Trade and War ; (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
 
3 As Levy rightly observes, “stability is one of the more ambiguous concepts in the international 
relations literature.” At one time Waltz equated stability with peace, and instability with war. 
Bur his definition left open the critical question of how to treat periods of crisis. As Lebow 
notes, crises fall between peace and war. This is perhaps why Mearsheimer defines stability “as 
the absence of wars and major crisis. Later, Waltz redefined the concept in terms of systemic 
durability: “systems that survive major wars thereby demonstrate their stability.” For more 
information see Levy, Jack S.; The Polarity of the System and International Stability: An 
Empirical Analysis ; (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985); pp.44; Waltz, Kenneth N.; Man, the 
State and War: Theoretical Analysis ; (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); pp.58; 
Lebow, Richard Ned; Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis ; (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); pp.16 and Mearsheimer, John J.; “Back to the Future: 
Instability in Europe After the Cold War”; International Security; Vol.41, No. 15; May 2001.; 
pp.5-56. In this thesis, stability in that context means the presence of clearly defined actors, 
objectives, decision-making models and behaviors in the field.   
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actors. In depth, symmetrical relations imply relations among parties whereby 
similar power capabilities, decision-making processes and political objectives 
had been confronting each other4. In contrast, asymmetry is a term used 
extensively, even casually, throughout the defense and security communities. 
Asymmetry or asymmetric has many definitions and is used to describe many 
things, including weapons system, tactics, strategy, and worldviews. 
Asymmetry in this context does not mean that the weapons used or necessarily 
better or worse that those of other parties. Rather, potential adversaries are 
willing to use such weapons without conventional limitation5.   
 
It is useful to start with the historical background of the term for its 
definition. It is an idea as old as warfare itself, appearing under a number of 
guises. Among strategic theorists, Sun Tzu placed great stock in psychological 
and informational asymmetry, writing that: “All warfare is based on deception. 
When confronted with an enemy one should offer the enemy a bait to lure him; 
feign disorder and strike him. When he concentrates, prepare against him; 
where he is strong, avoid him.6” The examples can be traced through the 
ancient ages: Merian strategy based on attrition of Athenian social order by 
insurgency activities; entrapped armies of glorius Alexander in the Indian 
                                                 
4 In fact the term is modifier and often used subjectively. As Alan Beyerchan suggests, “Like 
other members of a large class of terms, words such as periodic, asymmetrical, disequilibrium 
or non-equilibrium are deeply rooted in a cultural heritage…relatively similar features on the 
basis of similar value systems widely can be regarded as symmetrical. See Beyerchen, Alan, 
“Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War,” International Security, No.17, 
Vol.3; Winter, 1992; pp. 59-85.   
 
5 Lambakis, Steven, Kiras, James, Kolet, Kristin “Understanding Asymmetric Threats to the 
United States,” Comparative Strategy; Vol. 21, Issue 4; October 2002; pp.241. 
 
6 Sun Tzu, “The Art of War”, Samuel B. Griffith, trans.; (London: Oxford University Press, 
1971), pp. 66-67. 
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subcontinent by local tribes; German defenses against armies of Macsimus 
Artellius (Caesar) in the jungles of nowadays Baviera; Turkish pioneer raiders 
(akıncı) conducting covert actions such as technology stealing, assassination 
etc. behind the enemy lines  throughout Euroasia; colonial wars of European 
powers in the new world and also National Forces Movement (Kuvay -ı Milliye ) 
in the Turkish Liberation War and 20th century low-intensity operations, 
(military) operations other than war (OOTW/MOOTW) can be given.    
 
In the middle of the 20th century, the British strategic theorist B.H. 
Liddell Hart advocated “the indirect approach” in strategy. The wisest strategy, 
he contended, avoids the enemy’s strength and probes for weakness. Edward 
Luttwak, who is one of the more astute contemporary strategic theorists, has 
extrapolated a general rule from it. Strategy, Luttwak contends, involves actual 
or possible armed conflict between thinking humans and thus is dominated by a 
“paradoxical logic” based on the “coming together and even the reversal of 
opposites.7”  
 
Throughout the Cold War, asymmetry was an important element of 
U.S. strategic thinking, but was seldom called by that name. Matching Soviet 
quantitative advantages in Europe with American and NATO qualitative 
superiority was integral to U.S. strategy. Other concepts such as Massive 
Retaliation of the 1950s or the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s elevated 
asymmetry to an even higher plane. Beginning in the 1990s, thinking within the 
                                                 
7 See details for Hart, B. H. Liddell; Strategy ; (New York: Signet, 1974), pp.14 and Luttwak, 
Edward N., Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace ; (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1987), pp.5. 
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Department of Defense (DoD) began to shift with growing recognition of the 
potential for asymmetric threats to the United States. This was part of DOD’s 
increasingly sophisticated understanding of the post-Cold War security 
environment. Since the global distribution of power was asymmetric, it 
followed that asymmetric strategies would be a natural evolution8. 
 
While several definitions of strategic asymmetry have appeared in 
Department of Defense documents, Joint Statements and related academic 
studies most have simply codified the specific security problems or threats 
faced by the United States today or have reflected such an “American-
centrism” that their analytical use is limited. Starting with the joint doctrine in 
1995, the term was firstly used solely as a measurement scale rather than 
unique title of a threat category by U.S. security community. It presented the 
rules of engagement of unbalanced and categorically different forces in the 
theatre such as exchange between small or medium-sized naval vessels 
(torpedo boats, small submarines, etc...) and air forces equipped with air to 
surface missiles; light armored multi- functional land vehicles and air forces 
etc.9  In spite of its limited application, this was the first time that U.S. as a 
leading actor of the security environment determined the unfamiliarity of the 
forthcoming threats. In the 1995 National Military Strategy, the asymmetricism 
was used as a quasi-sole threat category that includes transnational and 
international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, 
                                                 
8 Source:http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2001/asymetry/asymetry.pdf ; Date: 27.07.2003; 
00:30; Metz , Stephen and Johnson II, Douglas V.; “Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: 
Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts,”  January 2001.pp.1-3.  
 
9 The comments are the summary of the official document. For more details see, Joint Warfare 
of the Armed Forces of the United States ; (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 
January 10, 1995); pp. IV-10; IV-11. 
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cyber-war, ethnic and religious conflicts and organized crimes10. In 1997, the 
Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and a commission report in 
the National Defense Panel (NDP) commonly implied that the new and the 
future foes of the U.S. from now on would not choose to fill the gap between 
superior U.S. forces in the air, land and naval theatres; and their own but 
instead they would try to look for and find out the vulnerabilities of the U.S. in 
terms of weaknesses of it towards its policies and interests11. The NDP 
specifically mentioned the danger from enemy actions that might cause greater 
than expected U.S. casualties, the use of weapons of mass destruction to delay 
or complicate U.S. access to a region and inflict casualties, attacks on U.S. 
electronic and computer-based information systems, the use of mines and 
missiles along straits and littorals, terrorism, and similar threats12. In 1999, the 
Joint Strategic Review and in 2000 Joint Vision 2020 made very significant 
contributions on behalf of the labeling the asymmetricism as a threat. For 
instance both of the documents stated the possibility of terrorist use of WMD, 
proliferation of ballistic missile technologies, state-sponsored secret NBC 
facilities and so forth as a asymmetrical threats towards U.S. security in the 
coming years13. 
 
                                                 
10 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms ; (Washington, DC: US 
Government Printing Office, 10 June 1998), pp. 668-670. 
 
11  Cohen, William S., ( Former Secretary of Defense); Report of the Quadrennial Defense 
Review ; (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office  May 1997); Section II. 
 
12 Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century ; (Washington, DC: US 
Government Printing Office, December 1997); p. 11. 
 
13 Joint Strategy Review 1999 ; (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 1999); pp. 1-5; Joint Vision 
2020 ; (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2000); pp. 5. 
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Particularly, the 1999 Joint Strategy Review provided the broadest 
official treatment (for U.S.) of asymmetry. It states: Asymmetric approaches 
are attempts to circumvent or undermine US strengths while exploiting US 
weaknesses using methods that differ significantly from the United States’ 
expected method of operations. [Asymmetric approaches] generally seek a 
major psychological impact, such as shock or confusion that affects an 
opponent’s initiative, freedom of action, or will. Asymmetric methods require 
an appreciation of an opponent’s vulnerabilities. Asymmetric approaches often 
employ innovative, nontraditional tactics, weapons, or technologies, and can be 
applied at all levels of warfare— strategic, operational, and tactical—and 
across the spectrum of military operations14.   
 
 
2.2- Contemporary Context: 
 
Following all those official documents and others, some academic 
studies have been also made. As an example, according to the account of 
Steven Metz and Johnson Douglas on “Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: 
Definition, Background and Strategic Concepts”, the definition would be: In 
the realm of military affairs and national security, asymmetry is acting, 
organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one’s 
own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain 
greater freedom of action. It can be political-strategic, military-strategic, 
operational, or a combination of these. It can entail different methods, 
                                                 
14 Joint Strategy Review 1999 ; (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 1999); pp. 2. 
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technologies, values, organizations, time perspectives, or some combination of 
these. It can be short-term or long-term. It can be deliberate or by default. It can 
be discrete or pursued in conjunction with symmetric approaches. It can have 
both psychological and physical dimensions15. Besides this wide and multi-
dimensional approach, in the McNair paper, the definition of the asymmetric 
warfare was formed as “leveraging inferior tactical or operational strength 
against American vulnerabilities to achieve disproportionate effect with the aim 
of undermining American will in order to achieve the asymmetric actor's 
strategic objectives.16” 
 
Before starting to operationalize the term asymmetric, the last step is 
the quotes of the non-American resources17. Non-English-speaking cultures 
define the term in more distinct ways. A Russian dictionary definition of 
asymmetry is "the absence or destruction of symmetry.18" There is no distinct 
word for asymmetry in Chinese. To express this concept one would negate the 
word for "to be symmetrical." This word for symmetry, duicheng , is also 
comprised of two characters. The word dui in ancient texts means "to respond," 
"to face or face off," "to match"—both in the sense of complement but also in 
the sense of enemies matching in skill. The term cheng  initially signified the 
                                                 
15 Metz , Stephen and Johnson II, Douglas V. ; “Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: 
Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts”; pp.12. 
 
16 Source:  http://www.ndu.edu/inss/macnair/mcnair62/toc.html; date: 02.08.2003; 23:40; 
McKenzie, Kenneth; “ McNair Paper 62,: The Revenge of the Melians:  Asymmetric Threats 
and the next QDR”; November 2000. 
 
17 For more information on revolution in military affairs in non-Western literature, see Sharjeel, 
Rizwan; “Revolution in Military Affairs”; Defence Journal (Pakistan); Vol. 29, No. 11; 
September 2000; pp.47; and Hasim, Ahmed S.; “The Revolution in Military Affairs Outside the 
West”; Journal of International Affairs; Vol.32, No.42; Winter 1998; pp.79. 
 
18 Ozhegov, S.I., Dictionary of the Russian Language ; (Moscow, 1984), pp.29. 
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concept of "a balance" and then evolved into a broader semantic sense of "to 
accord with." Thus, in China, asymmetry would involve things not in accord 
with, out of balance, not responding and not matching or facing one another19. 
 
 In his opening remarks of the symposium of “Globalization and 
International Security” in Turkish Military Academy on 29 May 2003, 
Associate Chief of the General Staff, General Yaşar Büyükanıt focused on the 
term asymmetric threats and defined it as “having relative superiority by 
aggressor, compared with its own absolute inferiority against adversaries…the 
concept of asymmetrical threat can be defined as activities that aim at being 
influential via applying low-profile technologies and forces which trigger 
instability in political, social and economic systems of the countries due to their 
creation of sudden and unprepared situation.20”  
 
Moreover, in the classified documents of Turkish Armed Forces, 
asymmetric threats are basically defined as aggression against vulnerabilities of 
a powerful state by a relatively weaker state or group via unique and surprising 
means by avoiding itself from strong capabilities of the target states. According 
to the report, asymmetrical threats form instability in the socio-political and 
economic structures of the target state via using low-profile force and 
technology21. Besides, Russian foreign Minister Igor Ivanov describes 
asymmetricism as follows: “They are terrorism and separatism, national, 
                                                 
19 Source:http://wwwcgsc.army.mil/milrev/English/JulAug01/thomas.asp; date: 23.07.2003, 
22:30. 
 
20Source:http://www.tsk.mil.tr/genelkumay/bashalk/konusma/sarem/saremaciskonusmasi_2905
03.htm; date: 02.08.2003; 00:30. 
 
21 Turkish Armed Forces, Foreign Threat Assessment , January 2003.  
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religious and other forms of extremism, drug trafficking and organized crime, 
regional conflicts and the threat of the spread of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), financial and economic crises, ecological disasters and epidemics. All 
these problems existed before, but in the era of globalization when the world 
has become much more interconnected and interdependent. The 
interdependence between countries is acquiring an ever more asymmetric 
character.22”   
 
As a result, the working conceptualization of asymmetrical for this 
paper would be: the imminent and clear presence of relation based on relatively 
disproportional, unbalanced, dissimilar and incommeasurable23 capabilities 
based on disharmonized interests with regard to a specific period among the 
units of international politics. Could the very existence of this relation become 
a threat, the aggression from the stronger or weaker party occurred unusually, 
irregularly and in a decentralized manner -which implies unconventional- that 
primarily aims at influencing the will of the opponent. In that sense, the value 
systems of aggressor and victim become important in terms of determining 
whether the threat is bearable, respondable, considerable and perceivable.  
 
In addition, the action of the aggressor should be difficult to respond 
in terms of unmatched arsenal structure and lacked strategic imagination. (To 
                                                 
 
22 Ivanov, Igor, "International Security in the Era of Globalization," Russia in Global Affairs, 
No.1; January-March 2003; unofficial translation from Russian. Source: 
http://www.ln.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/; date: 02.08.2003, 01:20.  
 
23 One civilian lexicon explains asymmetry using the mathematical term "incommensurability," 
the relationship between things which have no common measure in Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary of the English Language ; (Unabridged) (Springfield, MA: Merriam-
Webster Inc., ed. By Philip Babcock Gove, 1981), pp. 136. 
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this extend, U.S. military circles commonly refer to fourth generation warfare24 
- 4GW)  
                                                 
24 The term was first coined in the article in the Marine Corps Gazette titled by “The Changing 
Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation”  by William Lind on 13 October 1989.  First-
generation warfare was defined by close-order formations armed with guns to repel sword-and-
bayonet cavalry and infantry, something the young Napoleon perfected. Second-generation 
warfare's winners were those who had the most, or the best-managed, firepower, enabling their 
forces to win through attrition—an approach mastered by the Prussian army. Third-generation 
warfare saw second-generation armies being agitated by decentralized attacks that, though 
brilliant, ultimately failed by virtue of an opponent's ability to wear the attacker down. An 
example would be the Ludendorff offensives of 1918, when an initially successful German 
drive against the Allies ultimately stalled.  
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CHAPTER - III 
 
 
NBC TERRORISM 
 
 
 
To continue with the specific ramifications of asymmetrical threats in 
the form of NBC terrorism, what must be analyzed is its concept and basis that 
gives the primary clues for shaping the theory of asymmetrical deterrence. 
 
Before starting to explore the framework of NBC terrorism it is 
necessary to mention the fact that this thesis will use the term by excluding 
terrorist actions perpetrated via conventional means of violence that can also 
create a mass destruction as well as radiological weapons such as missiles 
involving impoverished uranium. On the other hand weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) is a former Soviet military term which was euphemistically 
used to denote nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons25. It is now widely 
used, despite debate over its appropriateness, and its definition has broadened 
                                                 
25 Gaddis, John Lewis; The Long peace :Inquiries into the History of the Cold War ; (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989); pp.25. 
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to include radiological26 weapons though that this thesis only contains nuclear, 
biological and chemical materials.   
 
In the context of analyzing NBC terrorism, this paper considers the 
transnational or international terrorism as the subject matter due to the its main 
concern about deterrence that classically based on inter state relations. Thus, it 
is firstly required to emphasize on the definition of the term briefly.  
 
 
3.1- Definition: 
 
There is no internationally authorized clear definition about 
transnational or international terrorism. In this attempt of defining the concept, 
United States –due to facing with remarkable acts of terrorism in 9/11/02, and 
United Nations rooted resolutions of 1368 on 11 September 2001 and 1373 on 
23 September 2001 are also considered as official contributions to this 
attempt27. We should continue the age old problems of definition, taxanomy 
and unit of analysis. Due to its nature in conceptualizing the transnational 
terrorism we should use the cases: From 1968 to present, the types of incidents 
that comprise the chronologies used in the ITERATE (international terrorism: 
                                                 
 
26 Radiological weapons use conventional high explosives to disperse radioactive material over 
an area. They are useful primarily as an area denial weapon, forcing evacuation and extensive 
decontamination. For more information see Ford, James L. “Radiological Dispersal Devices: 
Assessing the Transnational Threat”; Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Forum, 
Vol.23, No. 136; March 1998. 
 
27 Enders, Walter; Sandler, Todd. “Patterns of Transnational Terrorism”, International Sudies 
Quarterly; Vol.57, Issue.2; April 2002, p. 145-146. 
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attributes of terrorist events) textual and numeric datasets have the following 
attributes.28 
 
Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat of use of extra normal 
violence or brutality by sub national groups to obtain a political, religious or 
ideological objective through intimidation of a huge audience, usually not 
directly involved with the policy making that the terrorist seek to influence29. 
Key ingredients of the definition include the underlying political motive, the 
general atmosphere of intimidation and the targeting of those outside of the 
decision-making process. Whenever a terrorist incident (a bombing, plane 
hijacking, assassination) in one country involves victims, targets or institutions 
of at least one other country, the incident is transnational30. Reduction in the 
resources of terrorist or an increased difficulty associated with all modes of 
attack. When a terrorist act has ramifications that transcend a national 
boundary, it is an instance of transnational terrorism. Thus, it is first, purely 
international. Events that start in one country and end in another are 
transnational. An event planned in one country that attacks the citizens or 
property of a second country but on the soil of a third country is also an act of 
transnational terrorism. As a result, such actions via nuclear, biological or 
chemical mean form the NBC terrorism. It is not important whether the terrorist 
action aimed at mass murder or single assassinations in terms of determining 
                                                 
28 Enders, Walter; Sandler, Todd. “Patterns of Transnational Terrorism”, p. 131  
 
29 Hoffman, Bruce, “Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11”, Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism, Vol.9, No.1; Summer 2002, p. 305 
  
30 Enders, Walter; Sandler, Todd. “Transnational Terrorism In The Post Cold War Era”, 
International Studies Quarterely, March 1999, Vol.43, Issue 1, p.145. 
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NBC terrorism. In any terrorist action in which NBC agents are used as an 
attacking or triggering leverage, it is considered as NBC terrorism.  
 
Therefore assuming such a relatively extended and simplified 
conceptualization for NBC terrorism facilitates the efforts for determining 
precise touchstones of asymmetrical deterrence. 
 
 
3.2- Analysis of Motivations and Agents: 
 
A number of factors are seen as having previously constrained 
terrorist use of NBC material. Most terrorists groups possess political goals and 
have traditional, ethnic, nationalist, or ideological associations31. These groups 
seek to gain politically from attacks and to draw the attention of large 
audiences without diminishing their base of support. The conventional wisdom 
was reflected in expert Brian Jenkins comment several years ago, “Terrorists 
want lots of people watching, not lots of people dead.” For some groups, this is 
demonstrably no longer the case. However, even if a terrorist group sought to 
create an atmosphere of terror by inflicting large numbers of casualties, it need 
not turn to NBC weapons, as the latest World Trade Center airliner attacks 
graphically demonstrated. In another comparison of conventional versus NBC 
attacks, 168 people died in the conventional bomb attack in Oklahoma City, 
while only 12 people died in the nerve agent attack in the Tokyo subway. NBC 
use is risky for the terrorists themselves, uncertain in its effects, and carries 
                                                 
31 Sprintzak, Ehud; “The Great Superterrorism Scare”; Foreign Policy; Fall 1999; pp.46. 
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with it the possibility of severe retaliation. However, the increasing casualty 
count of attacks over the last several years has led many to argue that growing 
terrorist fanaticism and erosion of traditional constraints have negated the 
stigma of NBC compounds. 
 
Before analyzing deeply, when the open- literature is examined 
throughout on the basis of three main questions, a milieu of general 
assumptions related to the topic can be held32. 
 
Why a terrorist group might resort to the use of NBC weapons, and 
the circumstances or conditions in which this could be most likely; what type of 
organizations, according to their characteristics and objectives, might be most 
likely to use NBC weapons; and which of the NBC weapon types, and, as 
possible, which particular agents, would most likely be used, and for what 
intended effect(s). 
 
In terms of recent cases33, two issues included in nearly every 
discussion of NBC terrorism are the continuing security problems in the former 
Soviet Union and Aum Shinrikyo.s 1995 sarin attack in the Tokyo subway. 
Particularly in relation to biological, chemical, and nuclear terrorism 
possibilities, the troubles in maintaining security at former Soviet installations 
                                                 
32 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism: The Threat According to the 
Current Unclassified Literature ; (Los Angeles, CA: Center for Counterproliferation Research, 
National Defense University Press; 31 May 2002.) 
 
33 Cameron, Gavin; “Multi-track Microproliferation: Lessons from Aum Shinrikyo and Al 
Qaida”; Studies in Conflict and Terrorism; Vol. 22, No. 4; Nov 1999; pp. 277-309 and 
Hoffman, Bruce; “Change and Continuity in Terrorism”; Studies in Conflict and Terrorism; 
Vol. 24, No. 5; September 2001; pp. 417-428.  
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are mentioned as a key variable in assessing biological weapons (BW) and 
nuclear threats. Similarly, the diaspora of Soviet BW and nuclear scientists 
repeatedly is noted as a factor that could significantly affect the probability of 
terrorists acquiring these weapons. Here again, opinions diverge over how 
greatly instability in Russia and other former Soviet republics may aid 
terrorism, yet almost all conclude that it may play a key role. Aum Shinrikyo, 
often viewed as the only terrorist group to even somewhat successfully employ 
chemical weapons, is cited both by those who discount the possibility of NBC 
attacks because of Aum’s difficulties in spite of its large financial, material, and 
skill base and those who view it as the harbinger of greater NBC terrorist 
attacks in the future. Discussion of Aum, whether by those who see it as the 
exception or those who see it as the first of a trend, is prevalent throughout 
today’s literature.  
 
Furthermore, there is an emphasis on the state-sponsored terrorism. 
Often, the concept of sponsorship of a group is either equated or conflated with 
agents or agencies directly subordinate to state control. In this context, 
discussion of acquisition of NBC by .groups rather than states conveys a 
meaning that ranges from Special Forces to terror cells to, in some cases, 
individuals. Furthermore, the different postulated varieties of sponsorship lead 
to disparate conclusions regarding the prospective willingness of states to 
provide groups with NBC weaponry or assist them in acquisition or production. 
All in all, the literature provides no clear or shared understanding of state-
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sponsorship, yet recognizes its fundamental importance in NBC threat 
assessments34. 
 
At this point, there is a special tendency to mention. There is a 
growing interest on the BW for terrorist actions. This is followed, in turn, by 
nuclear, radiological, and lastly, chemical weapons. In itself, this breakdown in 
the relative percentage of discussion may be indicative of the relative 
importance attached to each threat by the various authors and the NBC 
community more widely. In other time frames, however (e.g., the early 1990s), 
the nuclear dimensions arguably received relatively greater attention. In 
particular, a sizable plurality of the available literature agues that of chemical, 
biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons, the biological terrorist threat is the 
most pressing at this time. As Robert Kadlec argues, biological weapons have 
.utility across the spectrum of conflict that allows them to be employed for a 
variety of attacks, large or small, against a wide range of targets, and with an 
equally wide range of effects. Furthermore, the insidious nature of biological 
weapons (BW), coupled with its ease of concealment and potential for mass 
casualties, increases its attractiveness to terrorist groups. Radiological devices, 
nuclear weapons, and chemical weapons, respectively, tend to be rank-ordered 
as lesser terrorist threats today35. 
                                                 
34 Lavoy, Peter R., Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds.; Planning the Unthinkable: How 
New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons ; (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2000); pp.43-48. 
 
35 Betts, Richard K. ; “The New Threat of Mass Destruction”; Foreign Affairs; Vol.77, No. 1; 
January/February 1998; pp. 26-41; Cameron, Gavin; Pate, Jason; McCauley, Diana and 
DeFazio, Lindsay; “1999 WMD Terrorism Chronology: Incidents Involving Sub-National 
Actors and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Materials”; Nonproliferation 
Review; Vol. 7, No. 2; Summer 2000; pp. 157-174; Carus, W. Seth; “Biological Warfare 
Threats in Perspective”; Critical Reviews in Microbiology; Vol. 24, No. 3; September 1998; 
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Moreover, the nature of the terrorist organizations is being focused in 
the agendas of the scholars. One point of general agreement is the inherent 
.conservatism. of terrorist organizations. While recognizing that certain terrorist 
groups may be inclined toward innovation in weaponry and tactics, and risk-
taking in operations or in weapon selection, many experts accept the notion that 
most terrorist organizations will prefer to use tried and true methods if these 
can achieve the desired effect. Innovation, particularly into the realm of NBC, 
most authors would suggest, is often likely to be driven by factors other than an 
organizations own curiosity or desire for experimentation. Both the increasing 
availability of material and, for many analysts, a penchant for mass-casualties 
among particular terror groups, is frequently viewed as drivers for the NBC 
acquisition quest. In terms of agent selection, few authors specify whether, for 
example, botulinum toxin would be more likely than anthrax, or VX rather than 
sarin. The same, however, cannot be said in a relative sense across weapon 
classes. While specific conclusions vary, many writers discuss the relative 
likelihood of nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical attacks. Similarly, 
they tend to view differing levels of attack; small-scale attacks with limited 
casualties or large-scale mass casualty attacks as either more or less probable, 
depending on a range of variables36. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
pp. 149-155; and Bowman, Steve, ed. Biological Weapons: A Primer ; (New York: Novinka 
Books, 2001); pp.46-87. 
 
36 Mueller, John and Mueller, Karl; “The Methodology of Mass Destruction: Assessing Threats 
in the New World Order”; Journal of Strategic Studies; Vol. 23, No. 1; March  2000; pp. 163-
187. 
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In addition, many articles addressing this issue tend to differentiate 
between the threat today and what it is likely to be in 5-10 or more years. In 
many assessments, the future threat is seen to be worse (sometimes 
dramatically so) than the current threat, despite some optimistic assessments of 
U.S. government responses to the prospect of NBC terrorism. Much of this 
negative evaluation of the current trend has to do with rapidly proliferating 
technology to state and sub-national actors; the evident progress in weapons 
programs in nations including Iran, Syria, North Korea, and others; and the 
continuing prospect of leakage and brain drain from former Soviet, South 
African, or other state programs37.  
 
On the issue of terrorist motivations and characteristics, the concept 
that a .new form of terrorism has emerged resonates through the recent 
literature. In particular, a number of authors have begun to question the long-
held notion that .terrorists want more people watching than dead. Many now 
claim that this view, espoused by Brian Jenkins several years ago, may have 
been true insofar as secularly motivated terrorist organizations were concerned, 
but that such an idea might not characterize well some contemporary groups. 
Unlike the left wing terrorist groups active in Europe from the 1960s to the 
1980s. Italy’s Red Brigades, France’s Action Direct, and Germany’s Red Army 
Faction, for example today’s purveyors of violence seem less prone to strictly 
.political statements. Those who argue that a .new terrorism is emerging point 
primarily to Islamic fundamentalism or religious extremism and its 
                                                 
37 Perry, William J. “Preparing for the Next Attack”; Foreign Affairs; Vol. 80, No. 6; 
November/December 2001; pp. 31-45 and Parachini, John V.; “Comparing Motives and 
Outcomes of Mass Casualty Terrorism Involving Conventional and Unconventional Weapons”; 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism; Vol. 24, No. 5; September  2002; pp. 389-406. 
 
 25 
convergence with three other factors: the deliberate quest to acquire or develop 
NBC weapons, a willingness to accept martyrdom, and a perception that the 
only audience of worth is that of a deity. Much of the current literature argues 
that for many religiously oriented or millenarian terrorist groups, which 
frequently appear to view their struggle as part of a battle of .good versus evil 
or as a precursor to judgment day or the apocalypse, a new mass-casualty 
motive structure has developed. In this view, such groups are detached from 
what might be considered .moral norms. or other social constraints and 
therefore do not feel restricted in considering the possibility of NBC weapons 
use, let alone conventional explosives, against whatever target they choose. 
According to this argument, such groups may not wish to achieve a purely 
political goal, but rather wish to advance a religious or spiritual purpose. In this 
context, the terrorists’ principal audience, perhaps beyond those that assist their 
cause, is that of God38. 
 
Others, however, have suggested that too much is made of religion as 
a motivation toward NBC terrorism. Rather, the characterization of religious 
followers as mindless zealots and murderous fanatics may be overly simplistic 
and may overlook other reasons for groups pursuing NBC motives that may be 
more classically .political.. Indeed, a number of authors suggest that while 
religion may certainly be a major motivation for organizations such as Al-
Qaeda, another motivating factor for acquiring and using NBC weapons may 
simply be their intrinsic shock value. For some, the mere threat of these 
weapons could cause substantial psychological, political, and even economic 
                                                 
38 Hoffman, Bruce; Inside Terrorism ; (London: Victor Gollancz, 1998); pp.51-89. 
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damage to a state. And in the case of radiological weapons, despite the fact that 
the number of immediate casualties would likely be far below those of a 
successful biological or nuclear attack, the potential for widespread public fear 
of radiation would likely nevertheless inspire acute psychological damage far in 
excess of the physical damage resulting from the attack39. 
 
In terms of modus operandi of terrorist organizations, NBC materials 
are considered as genuinely effective and efficient means to penetrate into the 
minds of target audience. Intimately linked to the threat-value of these weapons 
is the view, somewhat widespread, that terrorists may seek NBC because 
traditional methods may no longer be psychologically effective In this view, the 
idea is that much of society has become desensitized to acts of violence 
perpetrated with the bomb and the gun and that such tools can no longer create 
the same emotional impact or have a sufficient deleterious effect on morale. In 
contrast, the insidious nature of NBC cannot help but deliver an enormous blow 
against a group’s targets and enemies. While it may seem obvious that different 
terrorist groups may seek to attack very different targets based upon their 
underlying ideologies or beliefs, this is an important point with respect to the 
desire to propagate NBC terrorism. Since target selection varies, and since 
particular technologies and expertise may be more readily available, groups 
may opt to purchase or develop one weapon type over another. For example, 
chemical weapons will generally have less of an effect on physical targets, such 
as buildings, than, for instance, a nuclear device. Similarly, a contagious 
biological agent that targets agriculture could in theory impose a greater 
                                                 
39 Gurr, Nadine and Cole, Benjamin; The New Face  of Terrorism: Threats from Weapons of 
Mass Destruction .; (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2000); pp.36-50. 
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economic cost than a chemical attack. Target selection is a key variable: a 
group may not seek to acquire simply what is the easiest to acquire, but rather 
what they assess would be most effective against a specific target or target 
set40. 
 
 
 
3.3- Capabilities and Providers: 
 
In terms of technical capabilities, the question of sufficiency of 
finances and other resources available to terrorist organizations for NBC 
acquisition is roundly debated in the current literature. For some, a terrorist 
group need only control a budget equivalent to several million dollars and the 
means to acquire commercially available, often .dual-use biotechnology to 
begin a rudimentary, but potentially deadly, biological weapons development 
effort. On the chemical side, some suggest that a similarly small amount of 
capital would be needed to begin purchasing precursors for agents of chemical 
weapons (CW). The nuclear problem for terrorists, of course, is much different. 
Yet many who espouse the view that a terrorist can gain a NBC capability on 
the cheap. Suggest that a nuclear black market emanating in the former Soviet 
Union provides access at least to radioactive material, and perhaps even 
sufficient quantities of fissile material. At the extreme end of this argument, 
some even suggest that, based on the South African experience, a full-blown 
                                                 
40 Crelinsten, Ronald D. “Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in a Multi-Centric World: 
Challenges and Opportunities”; Terrorism and Political Violence; Vol. 11, No. 4; Winter 1999; 
pp. 170-196. 
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nuclear development program, minus the mining, refinement, and enrichment 
of fissile material, could be undertaken by a particularly well- funded terror 
organization. These arguments are equally well represented among skeptics. 
Rather than requiring simply a few million dollars and commercially available 
equipment, acquisition of a CW or BW capability, let alone a nuclear 
capability, is harder to accomplish than much of the popular literature suggests. 
Critics of the cheap argument cite difficulties in acquiring virulent strains of 
BW agents, the hazards involved in preparing them (and similar safety issues 
regarding CW), and the difficulties in developing effective dispersal 
mechanisms. In particular, this argument is often rooted in the experience of 
Aum Shinrikyo. While at its height the group had assets totaling approximately 
one billion dollars, a diverse and highly trained scientific workforce, and little 
scrutiny from law enforcement and intelligence agencies for a number of years, 
it largely failed in its quest. Despite its strengths, Aum was unable to acquire 
nuclear devices from Russia (where its activities were particularly strong), 
develop an effective BW capability, or develop a mass-destructive CW 
capability. Skeptics note that the 1995 Tokyo sarin attack resulted in only a 
handful of fatalities and that the dispersal mechanism devised was simplistic in 
the extreme; and even this partial success transpired after a series of failed 
biological attacks against U.S. and Japanese assets. Thus, the current literature 
is strongly divided on the issue of whether sub-national actors may possess 
sufficient technical and financial resources to develop a viable NBC capability. 
However, there are two points of general agreement on this topic. First, most 
agree that the black market in the former Soviet Union is attractive to groups 
that wish to acquire either NBC weapons or the know-how to construct their 
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own though the actual severity of .loose nukes and brain drain problems are 
debated. Second, any group that is able to recruit skilled professionals from 
relevant fields (chemistry, biology, physics, etc.) will increase its chances of 
obtaining or successfully developing NBC weapons. Although some argue that 
a college education in these fields is sufficient or nearly sufficient for basic 
biological, chemical, or radiological devices, nearly all agree that a group with 
trained professionals will need less time to construct a NBC capability and will 
increase its chances of conducting a truly effective attack41. 
 
On the basis of evaluating the relevancy of state-sponsored terrorism, 
there is a common opinion that most of the active terrorist organizations in the 
Middle East receive some form of direct or indirect support from states. Iran, 
for example, provides financial support to Hezbollah and Hamas. Al-Qaeda 
received assistance from Sudan and Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. Furthermore, 
each of these three groups is thought to be interested in NBC weapons; 
certainly, evidence uncovered in Afghanistan and elsewhere has underscored 
Al-Qaeda’s NBC efforts. However, the recent literature remains divided over 
the influence of and prospects for state-sponsored NBC terrorism. One 
argument is that only by being able to marshal some (or many) of the resources 
of the state diplomatic immunity, geographical sanctuary, intelligence 
information, national technological capabilities, and a large, steady source of 
funding, just to name a few can a terrorist group hope to develop an effective 
NBC capability. By contrast, while a state-sponsor may be happy to employ a 
terrorist group using conventional weapons for state purposes, providing a 
                                                 
41 Claridge, David; “Exploding the Myths of Superterrorism;” Terrorism and Political Violence; 
Vol. 11, No. 4; Winter 1999; pp. 133-148. 
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group, over which it might have only incomplete control, with NBC weapons 
may be too great a risk for many states. The possibility that a truly massive 
attack could be traced back to the sponsor, or that the group might turn on its 
sponsor could prove a deterrent to NBC sponsorship. In the end, however, most 
experts would agree that if a group did receive significant assistance in 
developing a NBC weapons from a sponsor state, that group would have the 
best chance of acquiring real capability42. 
 
 
 
3.4- Reasons, Consequences and Threats: 
 
Jonathan B. Tucker from Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the 
Monterey Institute of International Studies has claimed that the Tokyo attack 
served as a “wake-up call for policy makers the world over.43” The important 
interrelated context under the NBC terrorism in fact is the feasibility of terrorist 
use and handling of NBC material and vulnerability of political, military and 
civilian targets. Paradoxically, besides the increasing concern of NBC terrorism 
in nowadays, the statistical attitude demonstrates a decline in terrorist incidents. 
Compared with the 600 incidents per annum in 1980s, there have been average 
390 incidents by 1996. Even more significant were the increasingly 
sophisticated operations mounted by international terrorists with far greater 
                                                 
42 Lavoy, Peter R.; Sagan; Scott D. and Wirtz, James J., eds. Planning the Un thinkable: How 
New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons ; pp.52-59. 
 
43 Spiers M., Edward; Weapons of Mass Destruction: Prospects for Proliferation ; (London: 
MacMillan Press, 2000); pp.77.  
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technological and organizational talents. Bruce Hoffman from Centre for the 
Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at St. Andrews University described 
the larger scale of operations mounted in the 1980s, with more sophisticated 
conventional ordnance, timing mechanisms and precision-guided surface-to-air 
missiles44. The specter of terrorist attacks involving NBC has preoccupied 
security analysts both within and outside official government circles since at 
least the early 1970s. However, the perceived threat of NBC use by terrorist 
groups has been magnified dramatically since the end of the Cold War. This 
can be attributed to three main factors45. 
 
The first is the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and attendant concerns 
about the physical security of NBC assets in the territories of the former Soviet 
Union (FSU). The primary concern has been that lax security practices in the 
FSU have made it easier for terrorist organizations to access NBC technologies, 
either via covert purchasing arrangements or theft. The phenomenon of ‘loose 
nukes’ in the FSU has received wide publicity, but less acknowledged are the 
enormous stocks of unsecured biological and chemical weapons stemming 
from the massive Soviet Cold War inventory. One authoritative source has 
identified several dozen repositories in Russia housing BW stocks from the 
former Soviet program that lack adequate security and tracking arrangements.46 
 
                                                 
44 Hoffman, Bruce; “Low-intensity Conflict: Terrorism and Guerilla Warfare in the Coming 
Decades” in L. Howard (ed.); Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses ;  (New York: Preager, 
1992); pp.139-54. 
 
45 Hoffman, Bruce; “Responding to Terrorism Across the Technological Spectrum”; Terrorism 
and Political Violence; ,Vol. 6, No.2; 1993; pp.375-90.  
46Source: http://www.ceip.org/<wmdp/papers.html, Date: 03.09.2003; 22:00;  Cirincione, J., J. 
Wolfsthal, and M. Rajkumar, 2002. Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of  Mass Destruction  
(Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). 
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The second is the shifting contexts of terrorist paradigms from sole 
ideological rivalry towards more cultural and theological basis. The single most 
influential element uniting new terrorist groups has been hard-core religious 
dogma. Groups such as Al-Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo, and the various Christian 
Identity organizations active in the West are each inspired by the doctrine of 
‘cosmic war’ or “Jihad”, in which violence is seen as the only means to achieve 
“moral restoration47”. According to this mindset, violent acts are “sanitized” 
because they are symbolic, enacted on a cosmic stage48. Besides, in the form of 
pre-9/11 terrorism, mostly seen in 1970s and 1980s Europe by mostly left-wing 
terrorist and pre-suicide bombings era which encountered the time before 
198149 and after 1968, based on Palestine issued terrorism, the selective and 
limited violence was the key feature of terrorist groups. However, the mass 
murders due to demonstrating unlimited and non-selective violence have been 
brought into focus by terrorist groups. In addition to suicide bombings which 
have been familiar to the world public since 1981, particular events such as 
                                                 
47 Juergensmeyer, Mark; Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence ; 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001); pp.145-63. 
  
48 Simon, Steven and Benjamin, Daniel; “America and the New Terrorism”; Survival; Vol. 42; 
No.1; June 2000; pp. 66. 
 
49 The first major contemporary suicide terrorist attack in the Middle East was the December 
1981 destruction of the Iraqi embassy in Beirut (27 dead, over 100 wounded). Its precise 
authors are still unknown, although it is likely that Ayatollah Khomeini approved its use by 
parties sponsored by Iranian intelligence. With the assassination of pro-Israeli Lebanese 
President Bashir Gemayel in September 1982, suicide bombing became a strategic political 
weapon. Under the pro-Iranian Lebanese Party of God (Hezbollah), this strategy soon achieved 
geopolitical effect with the October 1983 truck-bomb killing of nearly 300 American and 
French servicemen. American and France abandoned the multinational force policing Lebanon. 
By 1985, these attacks arguably led Israel to cede most of the gains made during its 1982 
invasion of Lebanon.In Israel-Palestine, suicide terrorism began in 1992, becoming part of a 
systematic campaign in late 1993 with attacks by Hezbollah trained members of the Islamic 
Resistance Movement (Hamas) and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) aimed at derailing the Oslo 
Peace Accords. As early as 1988, however, PIJ founder Fathi Shiqaqi established guidelines for 
“exceptional” martyrdom operations involving human bombs. See 
http://www.interdisciplines.org/terrorism/papers/1/11; date21.05.2004, 19:45; Alan, Scott;  
“Genesis and Future of Suicide Terrorism” . 
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9/11 and 1995 Tokyo subway attacks have showed the catastrophic 
characteristic of the “day after.” This brings the low probability-high 
consequence matrix into consideration on the basis of terrorist involvement 
besides the threat of mutually assured destruction and proliferation of NBC 
issues.  
 
The third is the widening resource network in terms of skilled 
personnel, required technology and knowledge; improved movement of hidden 
financial exchanges and far less limited access towards related equipment such 
as detonating devices, delivery vehicles and fissile material. In addition, the 
dual-use nature of NBC compounds and non-conventional vehicles as seen in 
9/11 – it implies the use of planes, small boats, trucks etc. for delivering NBC 
weapons – add a great potential through the increasing importance of NBC 
terrorism.    
 
To achieve a realistic understanding of the scope of the threat it is 
necessary to draw a clear distinction between nuclear, biological, and chemical 
terrorism. Nuclear terrorism has long been anxiety but its potential was 
underlined by the Chechen incident in November 1995 and the efforts of the 
Aum cult to mine uranium in Australia and buy Russian warheads50. However, 
there is general consensus that nuclear weapons are more difficult to obtain 
than their chemical and biological counterparts. Despite some claims to the 
contrary, the core ingredients of weapons grade fissile material —highly 
                                                 
50 Richelson, Jeffrey; “Defusing Nuclear Terror”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March-
April, Source: http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2002/ma02/ma02richelson.html; date: 
03.09.2003, 22:30. 
 
 34 
enriched uranium and plutonium—are scarce internationally and very 
expensive to produce in sufficient quantities to manufacture even the crudest of 
nuclear devices. Moreover, since the mid-1980s, tight export controls have 
been observed by the small group of countries able to supply nuclear materials 
and equipment worldwide51. 
 
Nuclear terrorism could take several forms, including the making or 
stealing of a nuclear weapon for detonation or blackmail; an attack on a nuclear 
weapons site or plant to spread alarm; the sabotage of a nuclear plant; the 
seizure of a nuclear plant or its personnel for blackmail; the theft or purchase of 
fissile material for blackmail or radioactive material (Attacks have already been 
made on nuclear plants in France, South Africa, Argentina, Spain and the 
Philippines). For instance, if a group with sufficient skills was able to obtain 
about 30 pounds of highly enriched uranium, which is easily carried in a 
briefcase, or a small amount of plutonium (tennis ball size), and then spent 
some $200,000 acquiring readily available materials and equipment, it could 
build a nuclear device been in the mini van placed at the hearth of the Kızılay, 
it can be estimated that the area from Sıhhiye up to U.S. Embassy would have 
disappeared52. A more readily attainable option would be acquiring the 
requisite materials to fabricate a radiological weapon, or “dirty bomb” (i.e. 
conventional explosives laced with radioactive material aimed at propelling the 
latter across a wide area). There is some indication that elements of the Al-
                                                 
51 Milhollin, Gary; “Can Terrorists Get the Bomb?”; Commentary Magazine, Vol. 113, No. 2; 
February; 2002; pp. 45–49. 
 
52 Spiers M., Edward; Weapons of Mass Destruction: Prospects for Proliferation ; pp.85. The 
data is compared by the author with the city of Ankara.  
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Qaeda network have exhibited an interest in obtaining radioactive materials on 
the Russian black market for possible use in a ‘dirty bomb’, although it remains 
unclear whether their quest has been successful.53  
 
Generally, there is thought to be two main factors shaping nuclear 
terrorism; the know-how of how to build and use a bomb and the acquisition of 
the fissile material. While a nuclear weapon is the most destructive of all 
WMD, obtaining one poses the greatest difficulty for terrorist groups. The key 
obstacle to building such a weapon is the availability of a sufficient quantity of 
fissile material — either plutonium or highly enriched uranium. Some experts 
believe that if allowed access to the necessary quantities of fissile material, 
extraordinarily capable groups could build a crude nuclear weapon54. A much 
less difficult nuclear option is a radiological weapon using conventional high 
explosives to disperse any type of radioactive material. They obviate the need 
for fissile material and the complexity of a nuclear bomb. Though unlikely to 
cause mass casualties, radiological weapons could still have very significant 
radiation contamination effects if well- targeted. State sponsors of terrorists 
have been considered unlikely to turn over control of such weapons, once 
developed, to terrorist groups because of possible international retaliation or 
concern that the groups might leave their control. However, the problem of 
“loose nukes,” i.e., the possible leakage of nuclear weapons material and 
technical know-how from the former Soviet states, remains a cause of concern 
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that some believe increases the likelihood of a terrorist group obtaining a 
nuclear capability. It is important to note that even if a terrorist group were to 
get hold of an assembled nuclear weapon covertly, the built- in safeguards and 
self-destruction mechanisms would pose a serious challenge to detonating the 
weapon. In addition, the size of most nuclear weapons makes them rather hard 
to transport, especially clandestinely. The most likely means for such transport 
is judged to be commercial shipping55. 
 
 Indeed, in the mid-1980s an international task force reported that the 
manufacture of a crude nuclear device is within the reach of terrorists with 
sufficient resources to recruit a team of three or four technically qualified 
specialists and to acquire both the chemical high explosives and a sufficient 
quantity of weapons-usable nuclear material. In fact, a terrorist group may not 
need to depend on pure fissile material as mentioned above. Non-fissile but 
radioactive materials such as cesium-137, strontium-90 and cobalt-60 can be 
enough for causing unbearable damage on political, economic, social or 
strategic centers. Even though they will not form mass casualties, they can 
disrupt the stability and create psychological disorder in the target area. 
However, Brian Jenkins (deputy chairman, Kroll Associates) has claimed that 
terrorist would be more likely to show it as a threat rather than detonate it for 
persuade target states - in that sense, it is accepted that terrorist organizations 
are expected to be adversaries of states-56. 
 
                                                 
55 Kamp; Karl-Heinz; “WMD Terrorism – An Exchange”; Survival; Vol.41, No.3 Winter 
1998/1999; pp.57. 
 
56 Spiers M., Edward; Weapons of Mass Destruction: Prospects for Proliferation ; pp.80-81. 
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Besides, chemical and biological weapons are considered as a much 
more feasible threat. Prior to the Fall 2001 anthrax attacks in the U.S., the 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International 
Studies conducted a study of terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons.7 
The institute identified six characteristics among the groups involved in 
chemical/biological weapons (CBW) incidents: charismatic leadership, no 
external constituency, apocalyptic vision, loner or splinter group, sense of 
paranoia/grandiosity, and preemptive aggression. The two common 
characteristics that appeared in all cases of actual CBW use were the lack of 
outside constituency and a sense of paranoia/grandiosity. Only a limited 
number of groups were motivated enough to employ CBW, amongst them 
religious millenarian groups, small terrorist cells, and brutalized groups seeking 
revenge or facing destruction57.  
 
However, there is still a discussion about the first-choice of terrorists. 
Deutch argued that the likeliest threats would be chemical first, biological 
second and nuclear third58. In contrast, biological weapons are judged to be the 
ideal terrorist WMD instrument by some scholars for three key reasons. First, 
BW agents are far easier to acquire than nuclear weapons and it takes 
considerably less BW agent to produce the same killing impact as chemical 
weapons. Quantum leaps in biotechnology applications may mean 
revolutionary advances in drug discovery for treatment, but the very same 
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quantum leaps can be used to broaden horizons for acquiring new, and refining 
existing, BW agents59. Moreover, on a pound for pound basis, BW agents are 
far more potent than any of the most deadly CW agents, which must be 
delivered in massive quantities to inflict lethal concentrations over large 
areas.60  
 
Toxic industrial chemicals such as chlorine or phosgene are easily 
available and do not require great expertise to be adapted into chemical 
weapons. Nerve agents are more difficult to produce, and require a synthesis of 
multiple precursor chemicals. They also require high-temperature processes 
and create dangerous by-products, which makes their production unlikely 
outside an advanced laboratory. Blister agents such as mustard can be 
manufactured with relative ease, but also require large quantities of precursor 
chemicals. The production and transfer of CW precursor chemicals is 
internationally monitored under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the 
informal international export control regime of the Australia Group, providing 
some degree of control over their distribution22 Aerosol or vapor forms are the 
most effective for dissemination, which can be carried out by sprayers or an 
explosive device. However, agents are vulnerable to temperature, moisture and 
wind, and would therefore be most effectively used on an indoor population. 
The Aum Shinrikyo again provides an example of the unpredictable 
effectiveness of chemical weapons. Although the cult was able to produce the 
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nerve agent sarin and release it in a closed environment — the Tokyo subway 
— the attack resulted in only 12 fatalities, whereas there were 301 fatalities and 
5,000 injured in the conventional bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania. The potential consequences of such an occurrence were graphically 
demonstrated in Bhopal, India in 1984, when a disgruntled pesticide plant 
employee is believed to have caused the release of 40 metric tons of methyl 
isocyanides into the atmosphere. Over 2,000 people were killed and 100,000 
injured, of whom an estimated 50,000 suffered permanent disabilities61. Though 
the manufacturing plants, storage depots, and hazardous materials 
transportation infrastructure have long been recognized by counterterrorist 
experts as potential targets, until recently relatively little attention had been 
paid to the problem by private industry or the government62. 
 
Tucker observes that (a) chemical attack that caused 50 per cent 
casualties over a square kilometer would require about a metric ton of sarin. In 
contrast, microorganisms infect people in minute doses and then multiply 
within the host to cause disease. For example, a mere 8,000 anthrax bacteria—
an amount smaller than a speck of dust—are sufficient to infect a human being. 
As a result, a biological attack with a few kilograms of anthrax could inflict the 
same level of casualties over a square kilometer as a metric ton of sarin—
provided that the anthrax was effectively disseminated63.  
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Second, the effects of biological weapons on a target population 
would be extremely hard to counter. Administering vaccines and rendering 
more general medical assistance to a widely affected population would place 
unprecedented strains on emergency authorities. This is assuming that an attack 
using BW agents could be detected in a timely fashion. Indeed, one of the 
major obstacles for state authorities would be detecting that a covert attack 
using BW agents had actually taken place. For instance, vaccination against the 
most contagious BW agent, smallpox, is only effective if administered within 
seven days of exposure to the virus. Yet during the early stages of contracting 
the virus, individuals merely exhibit flu- like symptoms making prompt 
diagnosis problematic. Left undetected for even a few days, smallpox has the 
potential to spread rapidly among the target population, creating an epidemic 
that could be impossible to contain64.  
 
Third, the insidious nature of BW agents—composed as they are of 
living micro organisms with the capacity to reproduce and mutate—has the 
potential to psychologically ‘unhinge’ target populations. While many 
biological agents can be obtained or grown with relative ease, several 
significant steps remain on the way to weaponization and effective use of these 
agents. The main challenge is effective dissemination, which requires an 
aerosol form. The formulation of agents for airborne dispersal requires 
dissolving optimal amounts of agent in a specific combination of different 
chemicals (with each agent requiring a unique formulation). Moreover, aerosol 
disseminators need to be properly designed for the agent used, and suitable 
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meteorological conditions must be present to carry out a successful BW mass 
casualty attack. The Aum Shinrikyo sect again provides an example of the 
difficulty of conducting a successful attack. The sect had substantial resources, 
members who were trained chemists and bio-scientists, motivation, and ample 
time for research. Yet, they failed to carry out an effective BW attack despite 
several attempts, apparently due to the agent choice, and a formulation that 
clogged the nozzles of the aerosol sprayers. However, some experts believe that 
less efficient aerosol techniques may be obtained by capable non-state groups, 
and that even a crude delivery system could still cause casualties or injuries in 
the thousands, especially if the attack is carried out against a large indoor 
population65. Of particularly great concern is the threat of highly contagious 
diseases, particularly smallpox. Anthrax is not contagious from person to 
person, consequently its spread can be relatively easily contained. With a 
disease like smallpox, however, contagion can spread very rapidly. The breath 
or coughing of an infected person at the fever stage of the disease is sufficient 
to infect those around him or her. The disease has an incubation period of 12-14 
days, during which an infected person experiences no symptoms. 
Consequently, a clandestine smallpox release in a major transportation hub 
could infect hundreds, and would, in two weeks time, result in disease 
outbreaks wherever the passengers eventually traveled. Smallpox has been 
radicated as a naturally occurring disease, and the only two known existing 
cultures of the virus are held by the United States and Russia. Even so, 
concerns over the security of the Russian samples and the possibilities of 
unknown samples, have kept smallpox in the forefront of threat considerations. 
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Though the probability of terrorists gaining access to the virus may be very 
low, the severity of the potential consequences has nevertheless led the federal 
government to begin stockpiling 300 million smallpox vaccine doses. A 
relatively new concern is agro-terrorism: the use of biological agents against 
agricultural targets. The recent outbreaks of foot-and-mouth and “mad cow” 
disease in Europe have demonstrated the tremendous economic damage done to 
agricultural markets even when these epidemics occur naturally. Agro-
terrorism also provides the opportunity to inflict significant economic and 
social disruption without the stigma of inflicting human casualties. It is 
generally agreed that there is no way to guarantee protection against agro-
terrorist attacks; the targets and opportunities are too many. Consequently, 
significant attention must be paid to rapid detection and remediation66. 
 
As one analyst has put it, “because they are silent, stealthy, invisible, 
and slow acting, germs are capable of inducing levels of anxiety approaching 
hysteria67”. In order to ensure effective delivery to inflict mass casualties, a 
terrorist group would need to develop a powder or aerosol that could be 
disseminated over a wide geographical radius. Although it is told that, this 
requires considerable scientific skill and expertise that, most analysts agree, is 
still beyond the reach of most terrorist organizations. One of the main reasons 
why the Aum Shinrikyo sect used the CW agent sarin in its 1995 Tokyo 
subway attack was that it had previously failed to develop sufficiently virulent 
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BW strains of anthrax and botulinum toxin. This was despite the group being 
generously financed and its employment of some two dozen professionally 
trained microbiologists working in well-equipped scientific laboratories68. 
 
 On the other hand, with the aid of the financial support and/or state 
sponsorship, the open literature of chemical agents may also be preferable by 
terrorist organizations. For instance, the Aum effort for producing chemical 
weapons costs $30 million. As a result, to manufacture sarin, the Aum 
purchased filters and pipes made of hastelloy (a corrosion-resistant alloy), a 
fluorine treatment process and computer-controlled equipment in addition to 
acquire the stocks over 200 chemicals. Moreover, it is thought that if the 
terrorists had access to Russian sources, they might also be able to buy the 
services of underemployed or underpaid scientists or acquire chemical weapons 
illicitly from the seven storage sites in Russia, where are genuine concerns 
about physical security provisions (around perimeters and storage buildings), 
accountability standards and the local response and recovery procedures69. 
Even they can not obtain, steal or produce chemical weapons, they may still 
acquire with an exterminator’s license, toxic insecticides like Tetraethyl 
Pyrophosphate (TEPP) or parathion which are almost as toxic as their military 
counterparts. For example, the accidental release of 30 tons of methyl 
isocyanides – a chemical some hundred times less deadly than modern nerve 
agent- at the Union Carbide Plant, Bhopal, India, on 3 December 1984, 6000 
people was killed. Again, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report stated 
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that “… one ton (about 55 gallon drums) of agent contaminates two and a half 
square kilometers (one square mile) if properly disseminated.70”  
 
Besides, in the case of Tokyo subway attack, it is thought that the 
methods based on puncturing of plastic bags and the volatilization of liquid 
nerve agent (from an original two gallons’ solution of about 30% sarin.) Also, 
it is considered that diluted nerve agent and lack of aerosol generators were the 
causes of relatively low death toll. In detail, the operation was not conducted on 
Friday to pre-empt an imminent police raid; was prepared over a weekend for 
replacing stocks of sarin destroyed in the Matsumato incident and applied on a 
Monday morning. It is considered that had the cult been able to wait several 
months as originally planned, they might have mounted a more effective 
operation71 (they had already produced 70 tons of sarin, and had purchased a 
Russian Mi-17 helicopter and two pilotless drones to disseminate large amounts 
of chemical or biological agents. If the operation had not been botched, it is 
estimated that the attack could have killed thousands given the acutely lethal 
nature of the nerve agent used. As a result, it can be seen that on the one hand 
terrorists can use primitive means for penetrating target areas; on the other, 
they can also use sophisticated vehicles and delivery systems for contaminating 
targets. Moreover, the economical costs of relatively low-profile chemical 
attacks in terms of included number of personnel, offensive weapons and the 
small sized tactical plans compared with conventional terrorist operations 
demonstrate another crucial threat for target states and/or governments. For 
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instance, the poisoning of two grapes due for export from Chile in 1989, 
reportedly cost Chile $334 million72. Besides these, the psychological impact of 
the possible chemical attacks like nuclear and biological terrorist actions should 
be considered specifically. For example, after the attacks in Tokyo, the 
percentage of the people applied for psychological treatment by therapists, 
psychologists and psychiatrists due to post-traumatic stress disorder 
dramatically increased to 25% only in two months73.  
 
In addition, biological weapons (BW) demonstrate more preferable 
option compared with CW, radiological weapons or conventional weapons in 
terms of aiming at realizing much more casualties via much less quantity of 
agents and costs. Besides this, the easily produced BW which may not be 
detected imminently and even the perpetrators may flee the target area due to 
these sort of delays in perceiving biological attack. For instance, cultures of 
Bacillus anthracis can be found in research, clinical and veterinary laboratories 
and in the soil of cattle country; Clostridium botulinum can also be found in 
nature (as Aum managed to obtain in near the Tokachi river on the northern 
island of Hokkido), stolen from research laboratories or acquired for notional 
research purposes by mail orders from professional scientific and medical 
journals.  
 
However, like in other two options of unconventional mass 
destruction terrorism, state sponsorship can be argued as a prerequisite for the 
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effective use of BW agents. For Professor Milton Leitenberg, “isn’t all that 
easy for an untrained group to produce.” Also according to Karl Lowe (Institute 
for Defense Analyses) using BW requires calculations about the delivery 
systems; right amount of agent to inflict casualties over the target area; skilled 
personnel and sophisticated equipment. The lone terrorist, he argues, is less 
likely to master all these tasks that the terrorists benefiting from state-
sponsorship. However, there are also opposite views based on the network of 
uncontrollable technological knowledge and dual-use characteristics of NBC 
components74. In brief there is a growing tendency for perceiving a BW attack 
by terrorists as a probability rather than a possibility. 
 
To sum up, on the one hand there are views considering NBC 
terrorism less possible due to intentions and aims of terrorist organizations. 
Alienating public support, provoking international community for 
disproportional responses, required skillful personnel and qualified material –to 
some extend- are concerns of terrorists, as Brian Jenkins observed, “terrorists 
prefer to see a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead.75” Nevertheless, 
it may be still argued that greater diffusion and accessibility of expertise, 
materials, and more sophisticated, dual-use technology increases the possibility 
of NBC terrorism as a prospect.  
 
 
3.5- Specific Cases: 
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The representative examples of these statements introduced in the 
following clauses: 
In particular, Haraqat El Mukavama al Islamiya or commonly referred 
as Hamas can be taken into consider. For instance, Hamas’ deployment of the 
so-called Quassam missiles is a fairly recent development. The origin of these 
weapons is unclear. Hamas’s military wing, the Izzedin al-Quassam Brigades, 
declared to have built these rockets themselves, but some experts question the 
authenticity of this claim. Hamas reportedly possesses two functional versions 
of the Quassam. The more recent version is the Quassam-2, which was 
launched for the first time from Gaza on 10 February 2002, and then landed 
harmlessly in Israeli territory. The rocket is launched from a pipe measuring 
one meter in length and 120 mm in width using an explosive charge of 4-6 kg, 
and has a range of up to 10-12. Some sources have reported the existence of a 
Quassam-3. Records of the NBC terrorism database administrated by the 
Monterey Institute of International Studies show that the organization’s 
military wing has reportedly attempted to hire scientists with chemical weapons 
expertise in the US. One of the group’s members allegedly also confessed that 
this cell planned to contaminate Israeli water supplies in 1999 with chemical 
sources. Most recently, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) officials claimed that 
Hamas tried to include cyanide in the suicide bombing in Netenya, on 27 
March 200276. 
 
Turkey, due to her new geopolitical position faces the possibility of 
NBC terrorism. First of all, she is an en route for NBC smuggling from north to 
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south and secondly terrorist organizations can gain such weapons for using 
them in homeland. As we know, Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), tried to 
acquire a package full of anthrax and sarin but because of unrevealing of the 
Russian military officer who brought the package, they were prevented. The 
PKK’s connection to NBC agents consists primarily of threats; there have been 
three cases of actual agent use or possession. In 1992, cyanide was found in 
three water tanks near a Turkish air force base in Istanbul. In 1997, the group’s 
former bomb maker claimed in an interview that he had been ordered to build 
at least 12 powerful bombs containing rat poison, as well as sarin and 
potassium cyanide bombs. In 1998, 960 glass tubes of cobra venom were 
confiscated from the groups’ members. In this instance, they were planning to 
sell the poison for profit as opposed to using it as a weapon77.   
 
Another issue is the NBC smuggling. In fact, Turkey does not have 
large stocks of weapons usable nuclear materials. Turkey has only one 
operating research reactor. It is housed at the Turkish Institute for Nuclear 
Energy and is fueled by 20 percent enriched uranium. Lying at the crossroads 
not only between Europe and Asia, but also between the former Soviet Union 
and the Middle East, Turkey is already a well-established transit zone for illicit 
goods of other types. Since Turkey shares borders with both Iran and Syria, two 
countries of great proliferation concern, Turkish borders should be closely 
monitored to prevent anything radioactive from crossing them. However, of the 
existing 120 Turkish border checkpoints, only four are reportedly equipped 
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with radiation detection systems donated by the US, one for each border with 
Syria, Georgia, Bulgaria, and Iran. No detectors have been installed at Habur, a 
busy crossing between Turkey and Iraq, despite reports about ongoing 
smuggling across the Turkish-Iraqi border. According to internal classified 
report by the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority, 104 nuclear smuggling 
incidents have occurred in the past 8 years. The Defense Science and 
Technology Organization (DSTO) records 23 incidents of them as nuclear and 
other radioactive material linked to Turkey since 1993. 21 of those incidents 
involved nuclear material, mostly low-enriched uranium (LEU), only two of the 
incidents involved other radiation material78.  
 
 
 
 
3.6- Asymmetrical Nature of NBC Terrorism: 
 
To that extend, the asymmetrical environment of NBC terrorism can 
be traced firstly from its level of analysis: Non-state actors in international 
relations do not, as a general rule, operate according to the same normative 
constraints as sovereign states. While there is strong circumstantial evidence to 
support the claim that a norm of NBC non-use has evolved over time among 
states, there are few grounds for assuming that terrorist organizations will 
necessarily adhere to this norm.  
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Secondly, psychological impact in terms of creating an enormous 
coercive and disruptive impact, results even without mass killing or destruction. 
Causing or threatening to cause a NBC threat can deteriorate the stability in all 
levels of the social life in target area. In that circumstances the deep and 
imminent impact of the threat in social psychology of public puts it in an 
unbearable condition. In this context, such an attack would be asymmetrical 
due to the possibility of intolerable and unthinkable consequences that may 
paralyze the strategic thinking of the defender. As the head of the United 
Nation’s Terrorism Prevention Branch has remarked, the greatest challenge in 
evaluating the NBC terrorist threat is “walking the fine line between fear and 
paranoia on the one hand, and prudence and disbelief on the other”. 
 
Thirdly, terrorists operating (a)cross borders, either independently or 
with state-support make the nature of the threat difficult to define in terms of its 
organizational and tactical origins. Moreover, their inventory of weapons and 
their compounds helps them to keep the threat in “fog of war79” that wholly add 
the feature of non-conventional decentralization to the NBC terrorism.  
 
Fourthly, despite the main focus of terrorists is on NBC agents or/and 
weapons –which terrorists can acquire, use or attack the facilities-, the 
comparison between terrorist organizers and target state results with an 
asymmetric relation in terms of means whether the target state handles such 
weapons or/and agents. Either terrorists may use crude designs or sophisticated 
designs of NBC weapons or they may use conventional weapons but attack to 
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NBC facilities, storages etc., their arsenals and delivery vehicles or systems 
cannot match with the target states’. Although it may be considered that a 
hundred percent proportional symmetry cannot be feasible, it should be 
accepted that the gap between terrorists and target states are very plausible for 
an asymmetric relation.   
 
Fifthly, the usage of NBC material in a terrorist action would 
probably aim at, like most of the terrorist actions, affecting the will of the target 
state via exposing a catastrophic incident or a possibility of it. One the one 
hand the importance of relativity in threat perceptions and threat response 
frameworks of the target states would be transcended by the universal and 
absolute destructive effect of NBC weapons; on the other, the choosing of 
specific targets and delivery systems in a state still remains crucially relative. 
Avoiding confrontation with a target state where it is strongest (in conventional 
military terms), the modus operandi of terrorist groups has been to strike states 
where they are most vulnerable to attack (in densely populated cities). From a 
terrorist perspective, using NBC would graphically illustrate a capacity to 
inflict maximum damage against a stronger power at a time and place of the 
terrorist group’s own choosing. 
 
As a result, NBC terrorism, according the definition mentioned above 
can be categorized as an asymmetrical threat. Therefore the next step after 
linking the theoretical framework of the asymmetrical threat within praxis of 
the subject matter, is emphasize on deterrence theory for shaping the 
asymmetrical deterrence of NBC terrorism.   
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CHAPTER - IV 
 
 
DETERRENCE 
 
 
 
After conceptualizing the primary indicators of asymmetrical threats 
in terms of referring to NBC terrorism, what needs to be done is to prepare a 
formal theory as not only a strategy but also a kind of basic ground to explain 
such a threat. 
 
 
4.1- “The Concept” and “The Context”: 
 
In the context of the dispute in international relations, there are two 
possible consequences: conflict and consensus. Naturally, the parties of the 
dispute attempt to persuade and negotiate or dissuade and compel each other 
for managing such a disagreement. Therefore, there are two basic leverages for 
that management process: Diplomatic and military efforts. In this process, all 
parties whom are assuming that being weaker compared with other will make 
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them paralyzed, try to increase their capabilities. As a result, the whole process 
of managing such an imbroglio is constructed on deterrence as an ultimate ad 
foremost objective of all parties. Thus, to that extend, deterrence generally 
implies the direct or/and indirect use of power elements80 for ceasing the 
potential adversary from any mode of behavior perceived as a threat.  
 
In that sense, the concept of deterrence has been reflecting and age-
old story even since Thucydides. While Machiavelli was carrying the meaning 
in the Middle Ages, Metternich used the term diplomatically in the sessions of 
the meetings for providing “Concert of Europe”. In particular, in the eve of the 
19th century, deterrence had a mediocre implication of preventing any inter-
state (The term state for this specific time period implies both the empires and 
state- like administrations.) war for ensuring balance of powers in the 
continental Europe and colonies. Interestingly, one of the co- lateral results of 
the concert of Europe was the declared intention for concerning domestic 
secessionist attempts as imminent threats with regard to probability of 
instability81. Indeed, secessionist actors were the non-state units of that era. 
Thus, it might be argued that the roots of asymmetrical deterrence can be traced 
through the Congress of Vienna in 1815.  
 
However, the premieré of concept in IR literature occurred aftermath 
of the Second World War (WWII). In the pre-cold war era, regardless to 
                                                 
80 For a broader definition of the concept of power elements, see, inter alia, Morghenthau, Hans 
J.; Politics  Among Nations ; (New York: Knopf Press, 1948); pp.13-17; Brodie, Bernard; “The 
Anatomy of Deterrence”; World Politics; Vol.9; No.11; 1959; pp.173-179; and Glaser, Charles; 
Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy;  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); pp.39. 
 
81 For a broader discussion of deterrence in the history of international politics, see Howard, 
Michael; The Causes of War;  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983); pp.22-67, 
113-121.  
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technological level of weapons, whenever any war preparedness and 
mobilization started, it was aiming to win. In contrast, and for the first time, 
nuclear age transformed such readiness to a warless ground due to the 
probability of heavy costs in the day-after. As a matter of fact, deterring nuclear 
confrontation rather than winning a confrontation became the ultimate 
objective of parties in international politics. In that sense, the parties of the cold 
war also became the definers and users of the term. 
 
Deterrence is emerged in its classical form in the 1930s in the context 
of the new found capability to attack the whole of an enemy’s civilian 
population and civil infrastructure without first defeating its ground and naval 
forces. Airplanes and dirigibles were first used militarily in World War I and 
were employed to attack cities almost as soon as they were used for 
reconnaissance and attacks on the battlefield. Although the impact of these 
terror attacks was minor, the development of air power in the 1920s and 1930s 
allowed for the theories of Douhet and other military strategists. This theory of 
strategic air warfare argued that air forces could by themselves conduct a 
strategic campaign against the vital elements of state power that could win a 
war, with little or no involvement by ground and naval forces82. The 
implications of this theory led to the emergence of the theory of deterrence as 
known in 1932 the British Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, reflected in horror 
on the theory of air attacks as understood at that time: “I think it is well also for 
the man in the street to realize that there is no power on earth that can prevent 
him from being bombed. Whatever people may tell him, the bomber will 
                                                 
82 Maaranen, Steven A.; “Nuclear Weapons in Post-Cold War Deterrence”; ed. In Post -Cold 
War Conflict Deterrence ; (Washington, D.C: National Academy Press, 1997); pp.116. 
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always get through…” Accordingly, “the only defense is offense, which means 
that you have to kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy if 
you want to save yourselves83” On the basis of arguments like these, Britain 
engaged belatedly in the creation of a bomber-heavy air force that, it hoped, 
would serve to deter rather than actually fight a new world war.  
 
As it turned out, both sides in World War I resorted early to urban 
bombing. Conventional bombing could be defended against to some extend; the 
prospect of strategic conventional bombing did not deter war, nor was strategic 
bombing by itself able to secure the defeat of the opposing side (even though, 
eventually, the fire-bombing of Dresden and Tokyo, and the devastating 
thousand plane raids, approached nuclear strikes in the magnitude of damage 
they inflicted). The lessons of WWII changed abruptly with Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. Nuclear weapons clearly threatened damage that was unacceptable 
by any definition and would be almost impossible to defend against. Bernard 
Brodie, in his book “The Absolute Weapon”, in 1946, swiftly developed the 
theory of nuclear deterrence84.   
 
Indeed there are several concepts regarding emerging threats. To deter 
simply means, to inhibit or prevent someone from doing something. If 
deterrence of an undesirable action on the international scene fails, military 
force may be used for compellance, and if it is judged that the threat of force 
                                                 
83 Ibid 
 
84 See Brodie, Bernard; The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order ; (New York: 
Harcourt Brace, 1946). 
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may trigger a preemptive attack the forms of reassurance85 may be used beyond 
simple declarations to convince and adversary that an attack on one’s part is not 
planned . 
 
In brief, the development of deterrence as a theory has been tracing a 
process beginning from the late 1940s. Indeed, there is not any evidence of 
mentioning deterrence as a strategy in U.S. between 1945 and 1949 – probably 
because of holding nuclear monopoly. Nevertheless, Brodie was the first to 
mention the newly emerging character of post world war era in terms of 
purpose of the military: “the chief purpose of our military establishment (had) 
been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can 
have almost no other purpose.86” The break from multi-polar Eurocentric world 
towards domination of two superpowers formed the basic background for 
theorists to portray a unique framework concerning a sui generis  period of so-
called Cold War. Scholars like Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling, Albert 
Wohlstetter, Oskar Morgenstern, William Kaufmann, and Glenn Snyder 
contributed mightily to the development and improvement of the deterrence 
concept. Most importantly, the manuscripts of Rosetta Stone on the basis of the 
structural features of international system had been used by the decision-takers 
of the U.S. and later Soviet Union as a road map for managing the foreign 
                                                 
85 The terms reassurance was initially proposed by Sir Michael Howard to refer to the climate 
of reassurance  that U.S. participation in European and global security arrangements during the 
Cold War conveyed to the allies. See Sir Howard, Michael; “Lessons of the Cold War”; 
Survival; Vol.36, No.4, Winter 1994-1995, pp.161-166. 
 
86 Brodie, Bernard; The Absolute We apon: Atomic Power and World Order;  pp. 76. 
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policy affairs. In whole of that context, nuclear weapons and strategic stability 
were the “twin pillars” upon which this global formation existed87. 
4.2- Theoretical Underpinnings:  
 
Indeed “political realism”, “realpolitik ” or “power politics” has been 
called as the theoretical roots of deterrence concept. As E.H. Carr mentioned 
that “theories can not make practice but practice shapes the theories”, origins 
and implications of deterrence theory can be traced through cases of historical 
evolution of international arena from the realist perspective of IR. Indeed, 
deterrence as a formal theory, is thought to be a sub-division of realist school. 
Realism as a state-centric approach, historically rooted in the account on 
Peloponnesian War by Thucydides in 4000 BC; stemmed from Hobbesian 
inborn selfishness and self-help principle; deeply codified by Morgenthau in 
terms of power relations and transformed into a systemic framework by 
Waltz88. This school of IR assumes that in the absence of a supreme authority 
in international arena, states as the main actors exist in an anarchic 
environment. As a result, en route to survival, they need to maximize power 
based on capabilities aiming at having the possibility of control against others. 
Thus, such an intention of power maximization of states might trigger a clash 
of interests unless it would not have been balanced. Classical deterrence theory 
builds upon this theoretical base, and extends its domain, by considering the 
                                                 
87 Zagare; Frank C; Perfect Deterrence ; (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.3-
37.  
 
   
88 For a detailed debate on the issue see Glaser, Charles; “Why do Strategists Disagree About 
the Requirements of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence?”; ed. In Eden, Lynn and Miller, Steven E.; 
Nuclear Arguments: Understanding the Strategic Nuclear Arms and Arms Control Debates ; 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); pp123-187. 
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consequences of war in the nuclear age. In this regard, it might be argued two 
distinct, yet compatible, theories: structural (or neorealist) deterrence theory 
and as Zagare referred decision-theoretic deterrence theory89. Both of these 
approaches share a common background of realist school in international 
relations.  
 
Like traditional balance of power theorists, structural deterrence 
theorists see the key to international stability in the distribution of power –
within the system, in general, and among the great powers in particular. Most 
structuralists hold that when a parity relationship is combined with the 
enormous absolute costs of nuclear war, a deliberate (i.e. rational) war is at 
once unthinkable and virtually impossible. Those who subscribe to this view 
see the nuclear balance as unusually robust and stable, and credit the absence of 
a major superpower conflict in the post-war period directly to the enormous 
destructive power of nuclear weapons.  
 
Unlike structural deterrence theory, which finds the key to interstate 
stability in the structure and distribution of power, decision-theoretic deterrence 
theory focuses on the interplay of the outcomes, preferences, and choices in 
determining interstate conflict behavior. The game includes both formal and 
informal rational choice (expected utility) analyses and subsequent game-
theoretic refinements90. As the primary difference, decision-making theorists 
consider the micro situations of individually shaped policy-making process in 
                                                 
89 Zagare; Frank C; Perfect Deterrence ; pp.8-30. 
 
90 Ibid...pp.16. 
 
 59 
which “crazy states and/or leaders” that hold NBC weapons are in question. In 
contrast, structuralists intended to see states as like-units which have similar 
rationalities in regardless to their unique features such as Great Britain in 18th 
and 19th century and nowadays’ “rogue states.” From the point of decision-
making deterrence theory, nuclear war is so costly that only an irrational leader 
could consider it a means of conflict resolution91. 
 
To simulate the process of the decision-making in a possible nuclear 
confrontation, theorists generally use the model of chicken game. According to 
this, teenagers who represent authorized persons for deciding the use of NBC 
weapons, drive cars towards each other at high speed that will modeling the 
(un)intended escalation of disputes among states. The first driver to swerve was 
the “chicken” who would be disgraced, naturally, not swerving, was much 
worse, for both drivers. In this modeling, all parties first prefer to win by 
making opponent as disgraced. Second choice is to cooperate either by 
conceding the advantage to the opponent of mutually remain the status quo. 
Conflict, which implies the defection of both sides will be the least preferred.  
In consequence, theorists argue that any CBRN exchange would be the result of 
a series of irrational acts realized by mutually responsible authorities.  
 
Chicken captures well the underlying assumptions of realism in 
general and classical deterrence theory in particular. When analyzed as a non-
cooperative game in which binding agreements are not permitted, it mirrors the 
anarchy condition; as a non-zero-sum game, it captures the general 
                                                 
91 Ibid. 
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understanding among classical deterrence theorists that, in the nuclear age at 
least, states have a common interest in avoiding war, and as a two-person game, 
it starkly reflects the bipolar post-war international system92.  
Each therefore, touching upon deterrence by western scholars started 
in the meantime of Korean War soon after Soviet Union firstly tested atomic 
bomb in 1949 and dawn of the discovery of hydrogen bombs –U.S. tested first 
bomb in November 1952 before less than one year when Soviet Union 
exploded first hydrogen bomb in August 1953. In 1953-54, the strategy of 
massive retaliation developed by Eisenhower administration was brought into 
focus. Notwithstanding, the efforts of Soviets for balancing the nuclear 
warheads resulted with success. Besides, the U.S. denial of French request for 
support in struggle against Ho Chi Minh in Indochina and preference of 
conventional weapons in fights of Lebanon in 1958 showed U.S. administration 
the inefficiency of massive retaliation. Thus, in the beginning of 1960s 
demonstrated a change in the strategic environment to flexible response and the 
concept of selective targets. In fact, the process of nuclear balancing had started 
in 1957, when Soviet Union tested its first Inter Continental Ballistic Missile 
(ICBM) in August and launched Sputnik in October. Kennedy administration 
and especially the Secretary of Defense Robert Macnamara, tended to shift the 
emphasis from civilian targets to sole military centers for decreasing the affect 
of a possible nuclear confrontation. Meanwhile, U.S. tested its first ICBM in 
1959 and placed them into underground silos, trains –in fact it was a Soviet 
originated stockpiling style- and submarines for holding the second-strike 
capacity after elimination of its nuclear monopoly. As a result, for a short time 
                                                 
 
92 Ibid. pp.18. 
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in the late 1960s, U.S. had an over kill capacity due to its outnumbered 
warheads and delivery vehicles. However, after Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty 
(ABM) in 1972 and emergence of Multiple Independently Re-Entry Vehicle 
(MIRV) and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) such a doctrine 
lost its plausibility. Similarly, the doctrine of limited nuclear war, which 
suggested excluding non-combatants from nuclear exchange, became 
unpopular not only due to new strategic environment but also the concerns of 
U.S. allies based on being the theatre in a possible tactical nuclear weapons 
exchange. Therefore, in the beginning of 1970s, both powers had a sustainable 
second-strike capacity that was deployed in resistant bunkers, silos, trains etc. 
For this reason, nuclear deterrence started to work more constantly due to the 
stability provided by nuclear balance93.    
 
To make a long story short, traditional deterrence context has been 
transformed especially since the 1990. Although five nuclear weaponized states 
recognized by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty 
(NPT) have again declared their will for an ultimate elimination of their nuclear 
arsenals at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, 1990s has witnessed with a 
remarkable differentiation and increase not only in the quantity of ballistic 
missiles around the world but also in terms of their promoters94.  Besides, both 
deterrence models mentioned above has evolved from a nuclear learning 
process, an experience derived largely from the East-West, primarily U.S.-
                                                 
93 Gaddis, John Lewis; The Long peace :Inquiries into the History of the Cold War ; pp. 21-87. 
 
94 For an overview see, Aaron Karp, “The Spread of Ballistic Missiles and the Transformation 
of Global Security ,” The Nonproliferation Review; Vol.11, No. 7; Fall/Winter 2000; pp.106-
122. 
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Soviet competition. From this perspective, although the East-West relationship 
was fraught with potential danger, a sui generis order and stable was shaped 
that has by-passed the bloc rivalries. One the one hand, specific acknowledged 
states have exercised potential power of nuclear weapons in ordering and 
balancing the stability; on the other they have kept other states from acquiring 
such capabilities that would shake the strategic stability95.  
 
In general traditional deterrence theory entails five basic premises: 
vital objective of managing (in)stability rationally via awareness of credible 
capabilities and threats of all related parties and unique characteristics of the 
WMD, but especially nuclear weapons which would be perceived through 
effective communication methods.   
 
First, the concept of stability is defined in classical deterrence simply 
as absence of mutually assured destruction (MAD) in terms of interstate 
relations96.                        Secondly, in traditional deterrence theory, rationality 
forms the basis of decision-making process. Three different rationality concepts 
can be considered: Substantial, procedural and instrumental. While substantive 
rationality involves judgments about value preferences such as rational choice 
of being against murders or life over death; procedural rationality suggests 
resulted decisions after typical ends-means calculations by aware actors of 
international arena in terms of others’ perceptions and probable behaviors. 
                                                 
95 For a commentary on this development see Nye, Joseph Stephen, “Nuclear Learning and 
U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes,” International Organization; Vol.41, No.4; Summer 1987; 
pp.371-402. 
 
96 See Schelling, Thomas C. and Halperin, Morton Harold, Strategy and Arms Control ; (New 
York: The 20th Century Fund, 1961); pp.124. 
 
 63 
Beyond these, instrumental rationality puts relative preference among limited 
numbered options. In other words, actors implement deterrence as a 
consequence of cost-benefit analysis and choose an option which would be 
relatively more suitable and applicable for that specific environment. 
Therefore, policies that may seem opposed to former rationality concepts which 
are more macro perspectives may be visible and doable for the latter one97. 
However, in all mentioned above, units of the international system would 
conduct policies in a highly risk averse whereas all are aimed at safeguarding 
their survival and prompting their interests. Nevertheless, this can not change 
the famous motto of Thomas Schelling about the definition of deterrence as 
“the threat that leaves something to chance98” which implies the possibility of 
uncertainty in calculating the actions of units.  
 
Thirdly, if stability was the Heaven and rationality was the Holy 
Book; credibility would be the God’s himself. If you do not believe in and 
know, you will not read the book thereby cannot reach to the Heaven. In other 
words, a threat could not be effective unless an adversary believed that would 
be implemented. Besides, appropriate capability involved a complex 
consideration of what sort of force structure would be required to deter a 
particular adversary. This force structure came to be defined not only as the 
ability to deliver nuclear weapons to designated targets, but also required the 
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98 Schelling Thomas, The Strategy of Conflict,pp.41 and see also Ayson, Robert; “Bargaining 
with Nuclear Weapons: Thomas Schelling’s General Concept of Stability”; Journal of Strategic 
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possession a sufficiently survivable force capable of retaliating after an initial 
attack99.   
 
Fourthly, WMD and especially nuclear weapons have been considered 
as the foremost mass destruction leverages, the world history has ever 
witnessed. Therefore, as the fifth criteria; such an immense annihilation option 
ought to be recognized by an effective communication of threat which 
concerned the channels and language of communication. It is necessary to 
communicate an intended threat effectively to an adversary, as any 
miscommunication, misunderstanding, or misperception could lead to 
confusion about what responses would follow a particular action100.   
 
As a result, classical deterrence emphasized on prevailing in ceteris 
paribus –means keeping all other variables constant- in terms of protecting the 
status quos among states but mostly between great powers en route splendid 
existence of balance. Thus, interconnection and clarifying the perceptions and 
thoughts of those parties became crucial due to their necessity for taking 
decisions rationally as well as being aware of capabilities and threats.   
 
 
4.3- “The Challenge”: 
 
                                                 
99 See Schelling, Thomas C.; Arms and Influence ; (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 
1966); pp.134. 
 
100 See Brodie, Bernard, ed.; The Absolute Weapon ; pp. 83-84. 
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Indeed newly emerged international environment that contains 
engagements out of rules based upon classical deterrence requires revisiting 
theoretical background. To this extend, Darrly Howlett’s rapprochement about 
defining ideal types as “established”, “semi-established” and “non-established” 
deterrent relationships. To him, established deterrence relationships are 
characterized by a high degree of institutionalization (formal or informal), 
primarily between two states or alliances. This type of arrangement could 
generate two potentially significant features. First, it may lead to a reasonable 
degree of expectation about future behavior. Second, prior historical experience 
and collective institutional memory may lead to the evolution of a common 
understanding concerning the requirements of stable deterrence. In a semi-
established deterrence relationship, measures to regulate competition and 
mutual understandings concerning stability are in their formative stages. Some 
institutional procedures have been established, but the learning curve has not 
yet generated nuclear regulatory rules and procedures that are accepted by all 
parties. Non-established deterrence refers to those relationships in which 
different types of capability that could establish the basis for deterrence exist, 
but without any historical and procedural (formal or informal) interaction 
between any of the relevant parties about the meaning of stability or the 
regulatory rules for their relationships.101  
 
Alongside, a wide array of various backgrounds that constitutes 
different perceptions about what indicates (ir)rationality, necessitates a 
reconsideration of this concept. Although, according to a another view which 
                                                 
101 Howlett, Darryl; “New Concepts of Deterrence”; Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 
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implies that preeminent existence of nuclear weapons by-passes such a 
relativity; determining cost-benefit analysis and calculations for non-state 
actors still lacks due to that interstate based paradigm. In depth, changing 
international and/or domestic environment that would lead to relative 
understandings of rationality could not change the balance of terror perceived 
by states in the Cold War era. Moreover, demise of Soviet Union has not made 
a deep impact on the strategic thinking of Russian elite concerning WMD apart 
from some reductive and regulative agreements. A similar point of view 
occurred in the Gulf War in 1991. While Iraq was launching Scud Bs to Israel 
in a hope to trigger an Israeli retaliation with WMD; Israeli and obviously U.S. 
strategic planners considered that Saddam Hussein would not fire a Scud 
missile with a NBC warhead even if he was an irrational ruler in terms of 
Western philosophical tradition102.  
 
However, such a prevailing nuclear taboo with regardless of cultural 
relativity among states may not be relevant in a situation that contains basically 
non-state actors, in particular terrorist organizations. Thus, it may dig a hole in 
the rationality criteria of traditional deterrence theory.               
 
Although in the post Cold War era, there will be a remaining trend to 
settle down disputes within the aspect of interstate paradigms; growing threat 
posed by transnational terrorism at large; and breakthrough created by 9/11 in 
                                                 
102 See Tannenwald, Nina, “Nuclear Taboo”; International Organization; Vol. 46, No.53; 
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particular in the immediate aftermath of the demise of bipolar system, has been 
undermining classical approaches concerning deterrence theory103. 
 
As aforementioned, robust intelligence and efficient communication 
capabilities regarding weaker and stronger sides of foes were laying the 
foundations of classical deterrence theory that permitted states to calculate 
rational cost and profit analysis. However dissolution of the Soviet Union 
following the end of the Cold War has pawed the way for procurement of every 
kind of different WMD including weaponry systems, raw materials, delivery 
systems and even know-how of collective experienced memory depended upon 
elite scientists. Needless to say, this period may probably lead proliferation of 
WMD throughout the globe including terrorist organizations. In response to 
this, states can implement more classical approaches based on interstate 
paradigms and may account on other states just as Israel’s retaliation towards 
Syria due to terrorist infiltration originated from Lebanon or US’s reprisal to 
Sudan and Afghanistan after the terrorist bombings in US Embassies of Kenya 
and Tanzania.   
                                                 
103 From 1968 to present, the types of incidents that comprise the chronolgies used in the 
ITERATE (international terrorism: attributes of terrorist events) textual and numeric datasets 
have the following attributes: The major death tolls are steadily growing and dramatically 
increased after the 9/11. For more details see ITERATE index in the Source: 
www.ciao.net/database/iterate/conclusion.htm; date: 11.10.2003, 21:20. 
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CHAPTER - V 
 
 
ASYMMETRICAL DETERRENCE 
 
 
 
To finalize with the touchstones and basic parameters of asymmetrical 
deterrence theory, the “challenging threat” should be redefined conforming 
with revisiting the deterrence theory with its critics. In the previous chapters, 
this paper directed its efforts at conceptualizing NBC terrorism on the basis of 
asymmetrical threat perception on the one hand; and recalling the classical 
premises of deterrence on the other. At this juncture, it will concentrate on the 
quest for an asymmetrical deterrence framework in reference to the 
shortcomings of classical theory of deterrence in the post cold war era as well 
as emerging new array of threats based on asymmetricism.  
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4.1- The Challenge – II: 
 
In the post cold war era, some analysts concluded that deterrence, and 
all its attendant concepts, are no longer relevant. Regional and ethnic conflicts 
seem sure to dominate the new millennium, so the argument goes, and therefore 
deterrence theory can be safely relegated to the dustbin of history. 
Notwithstanding the recent accession of India and Pakistan to the nuclear club, 
the inter-state war between NATO and Serbia, and the inevitable proliferation 
of WMD, revisiting the theory of deterrence became a sine quo non .  
 
First, the news of deterrence’s death is most assuredly premature, if 
only because it remains the cornerstone of the defense policy of the U.S. and 
many other countries. For example, the Report of the Quadrennial Defense 
Review of U.S. Department of State in 1997 boldly asserted that “the primary 
purpose of U.S. forces is to deter and defeat the threat of organized violence 
against the U.S. and its interests.” Also, a 1997 Presidential Decision Directive, 
based on Quadrennial Defense Review, made deterrence (not warfighting) the 
primary mission of U.S. nuclear forces. This directive indeed, represents the 
first major change in U.S. policy for deploying nuclear weapons since 1981, 
and thus marked officially the shift of U.S. policy goals away from winning a 
nuclear war toward preventing one. Besides, in the White Paper of the Ministry 
of National Defense of the Republic of Turkey, it is clearly assumed that 
symmetrical threats have been replacing with asymmetrical ones so as to say 
deterrence will at least remain of its importance. Accordingly104, “the 
                                                 
104 Defense White Paper 2000 ; part IV “TURKEY'S DEFENSE POLICY and MILITARY 
STRATEGY”; section I “TURKEY'S NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY”; pp.1-2. 
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traditional concept of threat has now started to contain new threats and risks 
emerging in the form of: 
– Regional and ethnic conflicts, 
– Political and economic instabilities and uncertainties in the 
countries, 
– Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range 
missiles, 
– Religious fundamentalism, 
– Smuggling of drugs and all kinds of weapons and 
– International terrorism. 
 
In that sense, Turkey's military strategy contains four important 
matters to be able to support the specified defense policy: 
– Deterrence, 
– Military Contribution to Crisis Management and Intervention in 
Crises, 
– Forward Defense and 
– Collective Security. 
 
And deterrence refers to maintaining a military force that will provide 
a deterrent influence on the centers of risk and threat in the environment of 
instability and uncertainty surrounding Turkey constitutes the foundation of the 
National Military Strategy.” In terms of deterrence, although a narrow military 
contend was accepted, the concept has been keeping in the defense agenda.  
                                                                                                                                          
Source: http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/GnPPD/pdf/p4c1.pdf; date: 13.10.2003, 20:15. 
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Furthermore, when it is looked towards the non-western policies of 
deterrence, it can be clearly observed that the potential influence of NBC 
weapons, particularly nuclear weapons remains of crucial importance. In the 
Indian and Pakistani sources, it has been subsequently focused on functioning 
the deterrence relationship among India, Pakistan, China and even Russia. In 
addition, the research and development programs are targeted to manage not 
only high altitude inter-state conflicts but also low-scale intra state and 
asymmetrical clashes. Moreover, the security communities in those countries 
have initiated defense projects based on scenarios for retaliating stateless foes 
via unconventional means. As a result, neither the global powers, nor the major 
regional members of nuclear club seem to discard deterrence as a strategy105.   
 
However, this steadfastness towards deterrence has not been followed 
by the noteworthy scholars in the international relations. Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and the Cold War grew up together 
and found their identities in that historical relationship. The end of the Cold 
War demands that political leaders and military planners review what is knew 
about the NBC weapons and Cold War relationship. If the Cold War is now a 
political artifact, a sort of residue, are theories regarding NBC weapons will 
follow the suit? Some have so argued, but others maintain with equal 
assertiveness that the post Cold War world will have a place for such theories.   
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Indeed, the main reason rests with the enduring effectiveness of 
deterrence is their universal characteristic that is relevant across time and space. 
Furthermore, it operates across a wide variety of contexts and environments106. 
That is why this paper does not restrict itself in a mere inter-state level of 
analysis in discussing deterrence.  
 
Nevertheless, the context of deterrence has changed, and being eroded 
dramatically since the end of the Cold War. Actions for deterrence and for 
being deterred are now taking place in a dynamic and changeable process. In 
the connection with the nuclear threat, issues of proliferation, while 
conventional forces are becoming increasingly important, will remain of crucial 
significance. In fact, at the core of the concept of deterrence is the known 
ability to inflict damage that the opponent will view as unacceptable. Therefore 
WMD have come to be closely associated with deterrence because of their 
well-known ability to cause mass destruction and casualties Although the drift 
of events and world power structures appears to favor reserving NBC weapons 
to be used only to deter the use of NBC weapons, including their use in 
extended deterrence –the concept refers to the umbrella extended over a 
country’s allies to protect their homelands, as well as its own, from attack, their 
potential use as a deterrent against conventional attacks in some future 
circumstances cannot be totally ruled out as the extended deterrence posture 
will remain of paramount importance107. 
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 The other weapons that produce mass casualties –chemical and 
especially biological weapons-are coming to be of increasing concern, because 
they may be wielded by terrorists or states who do not subscribe to the 
commonly accepted tenets of international norms. Considering the incidents in 
a sample period, 1999-2000, in terms of looking for NBC material usage for 
terrorist activities shows dramatic consequences.  
Table 1: Terrorist Incidents per year108    
 
Year Incidents Hoaxes Total 
1999 27 49 76 
2000 49 25 74 
2001 25 107 133 
2002 23 71 94 
 
Table 2: Incident by Type of Event109  
 
Event  2000  2001   2002  
Use of Agent 36 
(6)U.S. 
14(7 U.S./ 4 
Vietnam/   Australia/ 1 New 
Zealand/ 1 Israel) 
6(1 U.S/1 
Europe/2 Latin 
America/1 
Australia/1 Sub-
Sahara) 
Possession 6 3 8 
Attempted 1 1 1 
Acquisition 2 1 2 
                                                 
108 Turnbull, Wayne and Abhayaratne, Praveen; “2002 WMD Terrorism Chronology: Incidents 
Involving Sub-National Actors and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 
Materials”; Center for Non-Proliferation Studies; 2003; pp. 2; source: http://cns.miis.edu. 
During 2002, the CBWNP staff reviewed over 260,800 open-source reports and selected 1,088 
of them for further evaluation. It should be emphasized that since the database includes solely 
open-source material, certain shortcomings are inevitably present. In many cases, national and 
international media coverage of events is sporadic and dependent on the influx of local media 
sources. A further problem with open-source information collection involves relatively sparse 
coverage of international incidents in some regions, where the scarcity of accessible local 
media sources and Internet web sites can result in the omission of local incidents. Another 
possible shortcoming pertains to the representation of the data. Since the annual total of CBRN 
terrorist incidents is very low, a small increase or decrease in the number of cases could appear 
to be a significant trend shift, even though in absolute terms it is not. For example, the 
statement that attempted acquisition of chemical agents has doubled in 2002 might sound 
alarming, but in absolute terms this change involves an increase of only one case. A further 
problem is associated with the difficulty of predicting future events based on historical data. 
The fact that CBRN materials have so far not been used by terrorists to bring about a mass-
fatality event does not necessarily preclude the possibility of such an event occurring 
tomorrow. However, empirical data for the year 2002 does not suggest that a mass-casualty 
CBRN terrorist attack is more likely than was suggested by previous years’ reports. 
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 74 
Plot Only 4 6 6 
Hoax / Prank / Threat 25 603 71 
 
 
5.2- Theoretical Underpinnings – II:    
 
To continue with the theoretical challenges of the classical deterrence 
in order to accord it into asymmetrical threats, in a world that is not only 
anarchic but also bipolar, the fear of abandonment is exacerbated because 
junior partners can make only a marginal military contribution to a superpower 
ally’s security. However, in the context of asymmetrical deterrence in the post 
cold war era, minor partners can make greater contributions in terms of 
providing necessary tools and spheres for potential target states as an ally. In 
that sense it may be useful to compare the general structure of the above 
mentioned terrorist organizations. Needles to say, Al-Queda is the number one 
actor in terms of estimated members and budget. It is thought to control 60.000 
to 80.000 militants and an amount of 5 billion dollars to 10 billion dollars. 
Second best was Aum Cult with 3000-10000 members and a budget of 2 billion 
dollars to 6 billion dollars. Hamas, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC), Hezbollah, PKK (Kongre-Gel) and Chechnya based organizations 
form the third level with militants around 3000 to 6000 and a budget reaches 
nearly 1 billion dollars110. However, these structures can not match with the 
capabilities of their target states. In that sense, although there is another debate 
on the issue of capabilities of them whether they can capable to attack 
vulnerabilities of target states via NBC material, when general capabilities are 
                                                 
110 Steinberg, Gerald M.; “Rediscovering Deterrence After September 11, 2001”; The Jerusalem 
Letter; December 2001; pp.17   
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considered they can be regarded as either minor partners or transformed major 
partners of international relations and in anyway, asymmetrical deterrence 
entails to assume that terrorist organizations which aim at curbing and using 
NBC weapons are (semi) independent actors apart from state. This also implies 
that despite state-sponsored terrorism can be considered as wide-spread there 
may be terrorists who act independently from states and are hardly 
unidentifiable.  
 
Such assumptions also underpin the asymmetrical characteristics of 
deterrence theory. To recapitulate the deficiencies of classical deterrence theory 
and the possible responses of asymmetrical deterrence, it is necessary to 
highlight the two major strands of it. As mentioned before, structural deterrence 
theory focuses on the impact of interstate power relationships in the deterrence 
equation. By contrast, decision-theoretic model highlights the interplay of 
outcomes, preferences, and rational choice of determining deterrence success 
and failure. Structural deterrence theorists argue that deterrence is most likely 
to prevail when the costs of war are high and belligerent states are in balance. 
Thus, the absence of a major superpower war during the cold war comes as no 
surprise to them. This is why they argue that quantitative arms race help 
prevent war (additional weapons increase the cost of war), why they contend 
that qualitative arms races and defensive weapons are destabilizing (certain 
weapons may reduce costs for one or both sides), and why some of them are in 
favor of managed nuclear proliferation111. It is interesting to observe that after 
                                                 
111 See Waltz, Kenneth; “The Stability of the Bipolar World”; Daedalus; No. 93; 1964; pp.882-
886; Gaddis, John Lewis; “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International 
System”; International Security; Vol.32; No.10; 1986; pp.105-110; Mearsheimer, John J.; 
“Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War”; International Security; pp.14; 
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Pakistan and India decided to test nuclear weapons in 1998, one leading Indian 
official claimed that Pakistan’s tests were good for India. Another asserted that 
both sides’ tests would secure the status quo in Khasmir. And a third asked, 
rhetorically, “If deterrence works in the West...by what reasoning will it not 
work in India?112” Given the low probability of war between nuclear equals, 
structural deterrence theorists conclude that the gravest threat to peace is an 
accident or mishap. Continuing where structural theorists leave off, decision-
theoretic deterrence theorists presume that nuclear war is irrational. 
Consequently, the key to successful policy in the nuclear age lies in crisis 
management. The critical task is then to manipulate optimally an adversary’s 
behavior and, at the same time, to avoid mistakes113. 
 
In the context of this age-old debate between structuralists and 
decision-making theorists, asymmetrical deterrence occupies a place whereby it 
derives assumptions from both grounds. While asymmetrical deterrence 
falsifies the mere inter-state relationships, it assumes that state efficiency, 
particularly coded as state-sponsored ship can be a subject of asymmetrical 
deterrence. In other words, state parties may attempt to deter other states in 
order to prevent their support for NBC material to the terrorist organizations 
which will also deter those terrorists to the extend of incoming assistance. In 
July 2002, Russian special services participating in counterterrorist operations 
in the Northern Caucuses uncovered information that Chechen rebels were 
                                                                                                                                          
Snyder, Glenn H. and Diesing, Paul; Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision -Making 
and System Structure in International Crises ; (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); 
pp.450-453.  
 
112Zagare, Frank C.; Perfect Deterrence ; pp.287-288 
  
113 Ibid. 299. 
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planning to use a potent poisonous substance to poison water and food supplies 
in Groznyy. Accordingly, the necessary material and know-how was coming 
from Arabian scientists stayed in Georgia for a civil project on environmental 
degradition114. In the immediate aftermath, Yuri Krokunov, chief adviser of 
Security Council of Russia on 22 August 2002 in Pravda and Mikhail Lysenko, 
deputy director of Security and Disarmament Department in Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Russia, stated one day later in Zevzetskaya that any NBC 
terrorism will be punishes by massive reaction that includes usage of 
unconventional weapons to the supporting states. Although those statements 
stimulated a few scholars in the world, Georgian President Edward 
Shevardnadze interviewed with a journalist from Pravda on13 September 2002 
and mentioned that Georgia will take all necessary steps to prevent terrorists to 
use NBC material. Interestingly, he neither rejected the allegations nor talked 
about former efforts (if there were). In this micro-escalation spiral ended with 
compromise, it would not be irrelevant to consider deterrence.  
 
Besides, asymmetrical deterrence includes so-called irrational actors 
into its agenda while assuming that they will also have some sort of rationality 
in terms of being deterred. Notwithstanding, it does not restrict itself with 
western-type rational man. Instead of that standardized understanding of 
rationality. It advocates a relative rationality based on different perceptions and 
understandings depending upon different values and norms. In that sense, the 
critical point is for a successful asymmetrical deterrence, the threat of 
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punishment must be made on the basis of deterree’s rationality rather than 
deterrent’s.  
 
In terms of empirical anomalies of classical deterrence classical 
deterrence theory seems to demonstrate the sole functional and working point 
of view that has explained the cold war period in terms of an absence of a 
major superpower war. That is why structural realism in general, and classical 
deterrence theory in particular, was, and is, “the dominant school of thought in 
International Relations theory115” 
 
However, there is still a milieu of unanswered questions regarding the 
so-called splendid functioning of deterrence. Indeed those question marks in 
the minds are the grass-roots of debates carrying out on post cold-war 
deterrence concept, thus shape the touchstones of asymmetrical deterrence.  
 
First of all, according to some of classical deterrence theorists, the 
main reason of the absence of a major superpower war relies under the fact that 
there was an enduring “equality of power...among the major powers116”. 
However, Waltz observed that if this would minimize the likelihood of war, 
World War I should never have been fought117. Even more, all major power 
wars for which there are reliable data have been fought under parity conditions, 
including the Franco-Prussian war, the Russo-Japanese war, WW II, the Seven 
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Weeks War, the Crimean War, and the War of Italian Unification. Needless to 
say, classical deterrence theorists consider a balance of capabilities as a 
necessary, though not a sufficient condition, for deterrence stability. For peace 
to reign, warfare must be also excessively costly118. In this view, each of the 
“two pillars: bipolarity and nuclear weapons119” must be present before war can 
be considered untenable. To be sure, no major power war has occurred under 
conditions of nuclear parity. But it is also entirely possible that this perfect 
coordination is spurious –that nuclear war has been avoided not because of 
nuclear weapons, but in spite of them. A group of analysis indicates that in 
militarized interstate disputes at least, nuclear weapons do not afford any 
special advantage to states that possess them, whether or not another party to 
the dispute also has them120. As a result, there is a tendency implying that 
balance of power is not a splendid provider of peace.  
 
In conformity with this assumption, asymmetrical deterrence, as it is 
asymmetrical, positions absolutely in contrast of balance of power due to the 
aiming at unilateral deterrence rather than mutual one. Moreover, NBC 
weapons are not primary means of asymmetrical deterrence due to the lack of 
sustainable clarity in traditional targets such as hidden caves of Al-Queda in 
Afghanistan, mixed dwellings of members of Aum cult in the cities of Japan or 
headquarters of Hamas at the center of refugee camps. In addition, the possible 
consequences may show an overkill capability in terms of handling WMD 
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compared with structures of terrorist organizations even if they were revealed. 
Although there are some research and development efforts on tactical nuclear 
missiles and earth penetrating missiles, especially in the U.S.121; their relevance 
is debatable. Instead, asymmetrical deterrence suggests more emphasis on non-
military means such as indirect delegitimization of terrorist causes through new 
foreign policies and creating as much as possible global stance against usage of 
NBC material for terrorism. Yet, the lack of a serious mass terrorist action via 
NBC material can be interpreted with the presence of a de facto global stance.  
 
For instance, As Jonathan B. Tucker observed, “it was not surprising 
that the Japanese government’s first policy response to the Tokyo subway 
incident was to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention and pass domestic 
implementing legislation122”. To continue with developments in this field, The 
1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, the cornerstone of the chemical weapons 
nonproliferation regime, requires parties to eliminate all stocks of chemical 
weapons and permit international monitoring of both government and 
commercial facilities to verify compliance. In force for only five years, the 
treaty has already made progress toward reducing the threat from national 
chemical weapons programs. Nine of the countries previously identified by the 
United States as chemical weapons proliferation concerns—Russia, China, 
Iran, Ethiopia, South Korea, India, Pakistan, Sudan, and Vietnam—have 
become parties to the convention. Two countries that had not acknowledged 
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possessing chemical weapons, South Korea and India, have now declared 
stockpiles, and 11 countries, including Russia, China, Iran, South Korea, and 
India, have declared current or past production facilities. Besides, there have 
been similar developments regarding biological weapons. The 1972 Biological 
and Toxin Weapons Convention was widely viewed as a milestone in the 
history of arms control, because it was the first international treaty to outlaw an 
entire category of weapons of mass destruction. The treaty, however, included 
no provisions for enforcing compliance. At the time, little was known about 
other countries' biological weapons programs. Since the early 1990s, the United 
States has used a variety of nonproliferation assistance programs to ensure that 
former Soviet chemical and biological weapon scientists, equipment, and 
materials do not contribute to foreign chemical and biological weapons efforts. 
Under these programs, the United States is helping design and building of 
Russia's first nerve gas destruction facility, at Shchuchye, and dismantles or 
converts to peaceful purposes former chemical weapons production facilities at 
Volgograd, Russia, and Nukus, Uzbekistan. The world's largest anthrax 
production facility, at Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, has been dismantled, and 
thousands of former biological weapons scientists have received funding for 
collaborative research with U.S. scientists on both public health and bio-
defense-related projects. Security has also been tightened at culture collections 
around the former Soviet Union. But much more remains to be done. Moreover 
there are further steps to criminalize the biological and chemical activities 
regarding terrorist organizations. Although both the chemical and the biological 
weapons conventions require parties to prohibit on their territory any activities 
that are banned under the treaty, both conventions focus principally on the 
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actions of states, not individuals. And neither requires parties to establish 
criminal jurisdiction over foreign nationals on their territory who have engaged 
in prohibited activities elsewhere or to conclude extradition arrangements. To 
help fill this gap, the Harvard Sussex Program has drafted a treaty making it a 
crime under international law for anyone knowingly to acquire or use chemical 
or biological weapons or to help others do so. At the end of April, the British 
government endorsed the negotiation of such a treaty. As provided by treaties 
on aircraft hijackings, hostage taking, and the theft of nuclear materials, anyone 
committing a prohibited act would be subject to prosecution or extradition if 
apprehended on the territory of a party to the treaty. The United States should 
work with the UK to press for an international convention criminalizing 
chemical and biological weapons activities by individuals. If prevention fails, 
first, it should exhaust all reasonable diplomatic efforts, particularly those 
outlined in international treaties or UN resolutions. Second, it should have solid 
evidence about both the nature and the location of the weapons activities. 
Third, it must be reasonably sure that military force will achieve the desired 
result. Finally, it must keep collateral damage to a minimum to avoid exposing 
others to the very weapons its use of force is designed to suppress123. 
 
Furthermore, just as parity conditions are not associated with peace, 
there is no clear association of conflict with power asymmetries. Apparently, 
even when the motivation exists, states do not automatically act for their favor. 
Indeed the absence of a superpower conflict during the period in which U.S. 
                                                 
123 Harris, Elisa D.; “Strengthening Existing Treaties Chemical and Biological 
Weapons:Prospects and Priorities After September 11”; The Brookings Review, Summer 2002; 
source: http://www.brookings.edu/press/REVIEW/summer2002/harris.htm; date: 22.03.2004, 
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enjoyed nuclear superiority constitutes the foremost empirical puzzle for 
classical deterrence theory124. To explain this anomaly, that clearly forms an 
exception to the standard realist assumption that all states are “undifferentiated” 
power or security maximizers, and its corollary that “all other states are 
potential threats.125” Therefore, like Great Britain during the heyday of 19th 
century balance of power politics, the U.S. was considered exempt from 
Morghenthau’s famous dictum that “statesmen think and act in terms of 
interests defined as power126”. Likewise, the Sino-Soviet dispute demonstrates 
that the power imparity do not automatically lead to an outbreak of a war. 
Particularly, the question that should be asked is why Soviets did not wage a 
war when the U.S. credibility was at stake and their capability superiority was 
absolute127. 
 
To turn for asymmetrical relations, although disparity of capabilities 
forms one of the basic elements of asymmetrical relations, it will not 
automatically trigger a clash. Indeed, the nature of the asymmetrical relations 
based on unbalance of powers. As a result, classical deterrence assumptions can 
not be applied. Interestingly, the invalidity of balance of powers assumption for 
a successful deterrence equivocally confirms the relevancy of a possible 
deterrence relationship among differentiated units.      
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For this reason, neither is the balance of power the mere guarantee of 
deterrence; nor does the lack of it inevitably cause wars. Therefore, 
asymmetrical relations can be the subject of deterrence.  
 
Another serious discrepancy between theory and practice is evident in 
the actual behavior of states during acute crises and other periods of intense 
conflict. For instance, in the empirical examinations of Young “decision-
makers acted to retain wide freedom of choice as long as possible and to avoid 
becoming boxed into an irrevocable position.128” Similarly, Snyder and 
Deising’s analysis of sixteen major interstate crises, including some dating 
back to the 19th century, reveals that strongly coercive tactics such as physically 
irrevocable commitments or severe committing threats are rarely used129. 
Moreover, it is also telling that Snyder and Diesing could find but one instance 
of a political leader feigning irrationality (Hitler in 1938 and 1942) to gain a 
tactical advantage in a crisis. As a result, escalatory maneuvers culminate in 
war as opponents rather than “chickening-out”, choose to stand firm and resist. 
Thus decision-theoretic deterrence theory suffers as a descriptive tool because 
it is unable to account for the behavior of either the challenger or the defender 
in precisely those dramatic and dangerous interactions it purports to explain. 
Therefore, the standardized and stereo-type rationality models based on inter-
state levels of analysis on decision-making and action-taking models can not be 
sufficient for explaining a broad range of multi-dimensional and multi- faceted 
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levels of conflict among actors in international relations in general, and 
asymmetrical threats based on NBC terrorism in particular.   
 
Empirical difficulties aside, decision-theoretic deterrence theory also 
suffers from a more fundamental deficiency: in its standard formulation, it is 
logically inconsistent. Or as Gaddis tactfully puts it: “logic, in this field, was 
not what it was elsewhere.130”  
 
To demonstrate the problem, it is necessary to consider again the 
Chicken model. Recalling that Chicken encapsulates the underlying theoretical 
framework of classical deterrence theory, especially the presumption that 
conflict in the nuclear age is at once unthinkable and irrational, the critical 
assumption is the defining characteristic of the Chicken. If one accepts this 
characterization, and the presumption that Chicken accurately reflects the 
structural and psychological conditions of a bipolar nuclear relationship, then 
the problem with the theory is clear: assuming (instrumentally) rational players, 
the status quo should not often survive. Crises should be common and general 
deterrence should fail on a regular basis131.    
 
Generally speaking, studies in the mainstream deterrence literature 
have focused on what is called forceful persuasion, much to the neglect of 
tactics designed to enhance the prospects of peace by addressing a common 
root cause of conflict: dissatisfaction with the existing order. As Van Gelder 
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observes, “it is too often forgotten that successful deterrence requires not only 
that the expected utility of acting be relatively low, but that the expected utility 
of refraining be acceptably high.132” Besides if “all other states are potential 
threats133,” as Mearsheimer asserts, dissatisfaction with the status quo can only 
be a constant. In asymmetrical deterrence theory, satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction are variables. When dissatisfaction is relatively high, deterrence 
stability becomes increasingly tenuous. 
 
Within this framework, first, a deterrence theory that is thought to be 
settled for asymmetrical threats, should keep away from to emphasize on mere 
inter-state level of analysis even explaining terrorist organizations’ behaviors. 
Second, a possible success of asymmetrical deterrence should not depend upon 
the pure cost-benefit analysis in terms of psychical damage. Third, the size or 
the number of the weapon usually does not matter for assessing whether an 
asymmetrical threat exists or not.  Fourth, asymmetrical relationships may not 
contain a standardized and stereo-type rationality like in the Cold War 
calculations, thereby will probably involve relatively different reactions in 
response to same actions.    
 
Besides, asymmetrical deterrence should keep in the mind that 
deterrence is a strategic concept evolved in the Cold War and to achieve 
deterrence one must anticipate the possibility of a hostile action, detect its 
potential onset, and then dissuade the would be aggressor(s) from undertaking 
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it, by posing a credible threat of punishment the aggressor would find 
unacceptable and, especially, a promise that success of the aggressive action 
will be denied. This general answer to the question of what deterrence is do not 
change even today but more vitally, the new enigma starts with the phrase 
“how”.     
 
In that context, there is a paramount need to revisit the concept of 
rationality to understand the possible affects of state actions over decision-
rhetoric of terrorist organizations.   
  
5.3- “Rationality”: 
 
In the new debate over the continuity of classical deterrence, one of 
the sides argues that the essentials of rational deterrence theory, as potentially 
applied to the newer “regional” contexts, remain intact; specifically, that there 
is no reason why the same deterrence calculations that applied to the U.S.S.R. 
during the Cold War should not apply to the contemporary international 
framework. In that sense, they initially exclude the irrational actors from the 
context of deterrence, whereby only rational states are subjects of theory. The 
opposing side, which is also advocated in this thesis, argues on the grounds of 
questioning assumptions about rationality, different and new types of balances 
of interests and resolve, geographic factors related to propinquity, and the issue 
of regime as well as national survival, among others134.  
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In thinking about deterrence relationships, the key is to focus on the 
orientation of the organism both as an individual and as an organization within 
a culture and an environment that can affect its or their calculations of potential 
risk, loss and gain. In particular, this analysis should seek to identify the 
relevant needs, vulnerabilities, ideas, feelings, and experiences that are most 
likely to elicit certain behavioral responses. In respect of rationality in 
asymmetrical deterrence, the attempts to shape decision modeling and 
reasoning of the aggressor (who may not think himself/herself aggressor) may 
be useful. In attempting to define reasoning analytically, one could the structure 
the problem in several ways. This paper preferred to employ the concept of 
limited rationality that implies that decision-takers (1) attempt to relate means 
to ends  (their decisions and actions have purpose); (2) consider a range of 
options; and (3) evaluate those options in terms of likely outcome, most 
favorable outcome, and worst-case outcome. However, their decisions may be 
flawed because of incomplete or incorrect information, the mental frames 
through which information is viewed, anxieties, extreme dissatisfaction with 
the status quo, erroneous mental models of the other protagonists, and other 
factors whereby limited rationality allows for a wide variety of such cognitive 
errors135. 
Second, in retrospect the American theory of (nuclear) deterrence 
which underpinned, and sometimes guided, our strategic behavior in the Cold 
War, looks to have been nowhere near as magisterial as was believed at the 
time. Our theory, and attempted practice, of deterrence, assumed an effectively 
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culture-free rationality. The problem is not the irrational adversary; instead it is 
the perfectly rational foe who seeks purposefully, and rationally, to achieve 
goals that appear wholly unreasonable to us. American strategic thinkers have 
long favored the fallacy that Rational Strategic Persons must think alike. More 
specifically, rational enemies are deterrable enemies. Second, it is highly 
probable that the modern theory of (nuclear) deterrence, the proudest 
accomplishment of the golden decade of U.S. strategic thought (1954-66), was, 
and remains, vastly more fragile than two generations of American strategic 
thinkers believed136. As Michael Desch has observed, the development and 
deployment of absolute weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union led 
many to anticipate that this technology would encourage both superpowers to 
behave roughly similarly. Nuclear weapons were so destructive that they made 
cultural differences largely irrelevant. Instead, the nuclear revolution ushered in 
general theories of strategic behavior such as deterrence theory, inspired by the 
assumptions (homogeneous rational actors) and methodology (rational choice) 
of economics. Such rational-actor theories of strategic behavior dominated 
Cold War national security studies in the 1950s and early 1960s137. 
 
Apart from, even for the structurally simple, bilateral world of the 
Cold War, there are serious grounds to doubt whether the dominant American 
theory of deterrence and strategic stability was shared by the adversary 
asymmetrical relationships based on disparity among interests, goals, motives, 
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norms, values and capabilities surely ignores the standardized rules for 
perceiving events in the world138. In addition the American theory and 
attempted practice of deterrence suffers from a potentially fatal confusion of 
rationality with reasonableness. Much tends to be made in popular commentary 
of the issue of whether or not particular foreign leaders are, or are not, rational. 
The assumption is that rational foes must share a uniform strategic logic, or at 
least ought to be readily accessible to its unmistakable contingent menaces. 
More often than not, when the Western media worries about what it labels as 
irrational enemies or behavior, it is really referring to enemies and behavior 
that are judged unreasonable. The point that requires wider understanding is 
that to be rational is not necessarily to be reasonable, by a stereo-type standard. 
Rather is the problem one of enemies whose entirely rational behavior 
purposefully connects policy instruments (e.g., suicide bombers) with policy 
objectives that are an affront to specific values, including international legal 
and moral norms. Keith Payne has explained this problem: f rationality alone 
fostered reasonable behavior, and then only in the rare cases of manifestly 
irrational leaderships would we likely be greatly surprised. Assuming 
challengers to be pragmatic and rational, and therefore reasonable, facilitates 
prediction of their behavior simply by reference to what we would consider the 
most reasonable course under their circumstances; the hard work of attempting 
to understand the opponent’s particular beliefs and thought can be avoided. 
Such an opponent will behave predictably because by definition, it will view 
the world in familiar terms and will respond to various pushes and pulls in 
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ways that are understandable and predictable. Contrary and surprising behavior 
would be senseless, “irrational.” 
 
In short, the U.S. defense community had invented a Rational 
Strategic Person who should behave as American strategic theory predicted 
which is to say, by definition rationally and as a matter of optimistic 
assumption, reasonably. In other words, cultural differences that prevent 
accurate understanding of shared meanings between states can confound 
deterrence as practiced according to one side’s theory. As Payne notes with 
regard to the potential for deterrence failure in the post Cold War period: 
“Unfortunately, our expectations of opponents’ behavior frequently are unmet, 
not because our opponents necessarily are irrational but because we do not 
understand them –their individual values, goals, determination and 
commitments- in the context of the engagement, and therefore we are surprised 
when their “unreasonable” behavior differs from our expectations.139” This 
indeed, constructs one of the main pillars of asymmetrical deterrence.         
 
In classical terms, deterrence depends on uncertainty but not on the 
uncertainty of consequences. It depended for its credibility on the uncertainty 
of decisions making by crisis-bound leaders. However, in the climate of 
asymmetrical threats, in addition to unrevealed options scale for asymmetric 
actors in terms of their (counter)actions against their target countries, there is 
also the occurrence of unclear possibilities about consequences. For the part of 
former, in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, there is a lack of collective 
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institutional memory provided by a learning curve in terms of repeated actions, 
modalities and solid experiences that would project scenarios for decision-
makers to a reasonable degree of prediction –a degree that leaves something to 
chance.  
 
Since any theory of deterrence requires some degree of rational 
leadership of the to-be-deterred party, deterrence of asymmetrical threats must 
be established on rational decision building process of decision takers in non 
state organizations at least to a reasonable degree. Needless to say, the risk of 
irrational response, or the evolution of circumstances which even rational 
leadership cannot control, can never be fully ruled out. Although the possibility 
of suicidal fanatic leadership cannot be totally discounted, the history of the 
Gulf War and the negotiation process between Taliban and U.S. before the 
subsequent confrontations in Afghanistan on Al-Queda has demonstrated that 
leaders of so-called “rogue nations” or non-state actors may do back down 
when appropriately confronted However, there may be always some pitfalls left 
behind, “as a threat that leaves something to chance.” For instance the threat of 
nuclear terrorism by sub-national groups, with or without acknowledged 
encouragement by the leadership of “rogue” nations, is another matter. A 
nuclear response against such threats may not be feasible –the home base of 
potential attacker may not be known. The threat of nuclear weapons in the 
hands of suicidal fanatics, such as the Japanese cultists who recently released 
poisonous nerve gas in the Tokyo subway, can clearly not be credibly 
countered by the deterrence in any form. 
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Furthermore, in contributing to asymmetrical deterrence, identifying 
the factors affecting judgments and decisions of asymmetrical actors are 
extremely important. Suppose that methods such as cognitive maps, attribute 
lists, and other devices to develop strong alternative material images of the 
opponent are being applied. The next step will be identifying the variables most 
likely to contribute to the potential opponent’s behaviors likely best-case and 
worst-case outcomes of various options. It may not be very useful to attempt 
this in abstract forms, because so much of what seems matter is exquisitely 
context dependent. It should be more useful to brainstorm the problem with an 
interdisciplinary mix of regional experts and strategists, to identify key factors 
in concrete natural language, and to develop hierarchies of such factors or 
variables. Given the alternative images of the opponent and an understanding of 
likely options and major variables or factors, it is possible to estimate how the 
opponent might reason in a wide variety of circumstances; not merely today’s 
circumstances, but those that might exist in the future. 
 
These models will be beneficial for estimating the possible (re)actions 
of terrorist groups when being deterred or perpetrate actions that require 
deterrence. For instance, after posing to perpetrate a NBC attack to a target 
state; in response to the target states’ declaratory retaliation option, the decision 
takers of regarding terrorist group may announce that the reasons for their 
actions are compelling. That is, they “have no choice.” Such was apparently the 
terrorist organizations in the Middle East. Therefore, target state can formulate 
the behavioral model of those organizations and can conduct complementing or 
subsidizing policies for deterring such a “last choice” excuse. 
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It is at this point to criticizing arguments from Huth and Russet’s 
position for “rational deterrence theory should not be viewed as a general 
theory of the causes of international conflict and war. It is limited in scope to 
how sanctions and rewards can be used to affect the cost benefit estimates of 
the attacker’s two policy choices. Economics and political considerations 
beyond the defender’s influence may also shape the attacker’s estimate of the 
costs and benefits of using or not using force. In principle, these conditions can 
be incorporated into a rational choice model, but they are outside the scope of 
deterrence theory per se.140” In opposition, asymmetrical deterrence theory 
should contain third party considerations as an independent variable, 
particularly in the state-sponsored terrorism. 
 
For example, in this sense, the case of the Pakistan-Taliban-Al-Qaeda 
phenomenon, that started in 1994, has worth to overview. After the Soviet 
withdrawal from Afghanistan, the task of rebuilding the war-ravaged country 
was handed over to Pakistan, a close ally of the US during its proxy war with 
the Soviet Union. For its own strategic reasons, Pakistan wanted an amenable 
government in Kabul. It tried various permutations and combinations with the 
existing leadership among the Afghan refugees turned (holy warrior), but could 
not succeed. Finally, in early 1994, the then home minister of Pakistan came to 
the conclusion that there is a need to create an independent entity away from 
the traditional leadership of the Afghan polity. 1 By the time Pakistani ruling 
elite came to this conclusion, its own polity was cracking up due to four and a 
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half decades of mismanagement. Therefore, Pakistan going through the process 
of a failing state, began looking for shorter routes to achieve its own strategic 
objectives. These included strategic depth against India in the event of an Indo-
Pak war, and resolving the vexed issue of the Durand Line with Afghanistan. 
This apart, an interesting dimension to the Pakistan-Taliban relationship was 
put forward by Musa Khan Jalalzai, an Afghan journalist based in Peshawar 
North West Frontier Province (NWFP). According to him, their (Pakistan's) 
goal was at once ideological and economic. Some (Pakistan armed forces) set 
their sights on detaching Central Asian Republics from the CIS, which they 
hoped would lead to disintegration of the Russian Federation itself and the 
emergence of a new space dominated by conservative Islamic regimes. From 
this point of view, the return to power of the neo-communists in Dushanbe was 
a reversal for Islamabad, hence its support, through Afghanistan, for the Tajik 
rebels.141 
 
On the economic level, Pakistan sought to make itself Central Asian 
Republic's main route of access to the Indian Ocean. It, therefore, launched a 
huge roadway construction program in the summer of 1993, which was to link 
Karachi and the ports of the Indian Ocean with Central Asia via Peshawar and 
Afghanistan. According to Musa Khan Jalalzai, Maj. Gen. Naserullah Babar, 
interior minister in Benazir Bhutto's government, thought of two routes for 
Central Asia. 'If the route from Peshawar through Kabul and the Salang 
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Highway to Tashkent was blocked by war in Kabul, Pakistan should seek to 
open the western route, from Quetta through Kandahar and Herat to 
Turkmenistan142. 
 
If this objective of Pakistan is correct, it is operating on the 
assumption that having defeated the Red Army of the Soviet Union once, it is 
not difficult to defeat the disintegrated Soviet Union's armed forces guarding 
Central Asian Republic's again. This also raises the question as to whether 
Pakistan is planning to convert its Taliban forces into a jihadi Islamic army. 
One can notice a particular pattern to this effect in the Pakistan-Taliban-Al 
Qaeda combine actions. 
 
After giving support to the Tajik rebels, the Pakistan-Taliban-Al-
Qaeda combine target has been Uzbekistan. The leadership of the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) attempted to assassinate Uzbek President 
Islam. A. Karimov in February 1999, when six bombs in Tashkent killed 16 
people and wounded 128. The leader of the IMU, Tahir Yoldassev, then fled to 
the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. In May 1999, the Taliban allowed 
Yoldassev to set up military training camps in northern Afghanistan, just a few 
miles off the Afghan-Uzbek border. Unconfirmed media reports say that he was 
training several hundred Islamic militants from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan, as well as Uighurs from Xinjiang Autonomous Region in China. 
Initially, the Taliban denied having extended any help to the IMU. But in June 
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1999, when the Uzbek government requested for the extradition of Tahir to 
Tashkent, it was rejected by the Taliban. 
 
In August 1999, another IMU leader, Juma Nanangani, entered 
southern Kyrgyzstan with about 800 militants, seized villages and threatened to 
invade Uzbekistan. All this resulted in Uzbekistan severely condemning 
Pakistan for supporting the dissident movements in Uzbekistan. 
 
According to Ahmed Rashid, what brought in a new dimension was 
that:”. . . although the IMU are not Deobandis, they are influenced by 
Wahhabism and have tried to impose the Taliban code in their areas of 
influence. Although the Uzbeks have historically been suspicious of the 
Pushtuns, the Taliban offer IMU a sanctuary from the Karimov crackdown with 
weapons, and the means to finance themselves through the drug trade.143” 
 
With these objectives in mind, Pakistan became a guiding spirit and 
mentor of Taliban till about mid-1996. The arrival of Osama bin Laden in May 
1996 to Kandahar, and his assuming the leadership of Taliban transformed 
Pakistan's role from that of a guardian to a partner of the Taliban outfit. By 
1998, Taliban became synonymous with bin Laden's Al Qaeda movement and 
Pakistani soldiers started participating in Taliban-Al Qaeda activities. From 
1996 onwards, Taliban became a pressure point for Pakistan to pursue its 
foreign policy objectives in its immediate neighborhood. As it clearly 
demonstrates, statical bi- lateral options for assessing rationality profiles 
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standard parties can not be feasible for asymmetrical deterrence. In contrast, 
actions targeting the third- level relations and structural deficiencies such as 
attempts to rehabilitate basic fault lines among states or groups are necessary.  
 
In the classical deterrence, deterrence remains relevant when it is least 
likely to success, that is, when no consideration is giving to using force. Such 
could be the case when a potential challenger is extremely satisfied with the 
status quo, but it could also be the case when a serious capability asymmetry 
exists. Thus, the U.S. today might not consider an attack on Canada because it 
has no compelling reason to do so, and Canada might not consider an attack on 
the U.S. even if it had a motive to do so, because its chance of success is 
nonexistent. In both cases deterrence can be said to be operative. Should, in the 
future, the U.S. become sufficiently dissatisfied, or should a dissatisfied Canada 
become sufficiently capable, the stability of this relatively tranquil relationship 
could be eroded144. 
 
 Likewise, in the asymmetrical categorization of actors as terrorists 
and states, realizing satisfaction and incapability of terrorist organizations 
rather than showing a massive retaliatory capacity which would probably be 
irrelevant to most of them in terms of confirmed targets in particular territories 
can be a model. However, satisfaction in these terms does not reflect the same 
concept suggested in the traditional deterrence relationships. Of course no 
theory or an attempt to theorize asymmetrical deterrence involve an assumption 
based on taking terrorist organizations state- like units so as to consider their 
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satisfaction in terms of concession or give-and-take bargaining. Nonetheless, 
terrorist organizations can be forced to be satisfied indirectly. 
 
In other words, it is vital to include the factors strictly outside the 
defender’s control in terms of punishment capabilities and credibility in 
asymmetrical deterrence theory. For example eliminating the legitimacy of 
terrorist organizations’ usage of NBC weapons in particular, and massive 
killings in general depend upon reviewing the foreign policies of related 
countries. For example the stance of EU on the Palestine issue averted the goals 
of some terrorist organizations originated in the Middle East145. Therefore, the 
attitudes of the states against the “rational” causes of terrorist organizations that 
may hold NBC weapons are important in determining the possibility of their 
deterring possibility. For instance the stances of Germany and France towards 
the Iraqi operation of U.S. or U.S. policy in the Middle East peace process 
strengthen their defense values in terms of legitimacy and rationality of a 
terrorist attack. Obviously, there are various reasons behind such an attitude 
ranging from the population of Muslims in these countries to their strategic 
vision and capability which limit their global goals. However, in foreign policy 
formations considering the possible rational goals of terrorist organizations 
become much more crucial to prevent their massive attacks. This should not be 
considered as a direct concession like in a chicken game for providing 
deterrence. Instead, this is a strategic move to erode the rationality of non-state 
actors that probably affect their will to use NBC weapons.  
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 However, a mere attempt of elimination of specific rational goals of 
particular terrorist organizations is necessary but can not be sufficient. In 
addition, the capability issue should be seriously taken into consider because 
solving this problem generally limit all terrorist organizations.  
  
To continue with the cases, for instance Al-Qaeda operates rationally 
and strategically; it has some terrestrial goals, notwithstanding its apocalyptic 
ideas. For instance, for cultural and political reasons, it will not be possible for 
the United States to compete in the realm of ideas, but as a foreign policy 
strategy, “the support of moderate branches of Islam146” as Antulio Echevarria 
recommends, may level the playing field notably. They can oblige Al-Qaeda to 
compete with its own expectations and promises besides struggling them 
through military means. As Mao Tse-tung wrote, “(t)here is in guerrilla warfare 
no such thing as a decisive battle.147” Whether terrorist operations succeed or 
fail tactically, realization by their perpetrators that such behavior is strategically 
futile should serve slowly, but inexorably, to reduce enthusiasm and 
commitment. Few developments have so self-deterring a consequence as the 
unwelcome recognition that one’s efforts are a failure. This can be true for 
other states that have been competing with terrorist organizations.  
 
In May 2002, Hindu organizations in Holland received letters 
containing suspicious powder and threatening notes. The letters reportedly were 
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sent by a Muslim organization acting on behalf of a secret cell called “the 
Netherlands Al-Qaeda Branch.” The letters also reportedly contained notes that 
threatened Hindus with murder, rape, and blackmail unless they dissolved their 
organizations in three weeks. In a few days later, the government of 
Netherlands stated that if such threats were to continue, they would seriously 
discuss the enclosure of Islamic foundations and organizations as well as to 
arrest the several religious leaders living in the country148. Interestingly, on 4 
June 2002, a letter, declaring that if Netherlands government did not take 
further steps for limiting the rights of Muslim, they would not act “for 
protecting themselves” was received by the same organizations149. Notably 
there has been a growing trend in the Muslim population of Europe in terms of 
organizing and founding various structures for providing solidarity in every 
field of social life due to the several reasons including racism and unstable 
migration policies. Such organizations also provide a fertile ground to establish 
financial networks for terrorist organizations. In that sense, an intelligence 
report of Dutch Royal Intelligence Service (DRIS) mentions the large amounts 
of money transferring to the Pakistan National Bank150. As a result, to threat 
this network seems to be functional for deterring regarding branch. Indeed, the 
most important step is to find the vulnerability of related terrorist group. There 
may be different options for each terrorist group. For example, on 14 May 
2002, in a press release, the Colombian Army accused the FARC of using 
chemical weapons. According to Colombian military officials, FARC carried 
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out attacks with ammonia-filled gas cylinders. In a week, a statement of FARC 
representative in Cuba mentioned that FARC never uses “weapons that kill 
innocent people and nature.” Interestingly, this was the first statement made by 
a FARC leader to the public on WMD; and to publicize the usage of such 
weapons seems to be illegitimate for this organization. As a result, even though 
official statements can not be seriously considered by the region’s people, they 
may make a gradual impact on terrorists, particularly in the eyes of the 
international community. This is another example for vulnerability. In fact, 
rationality that depends upon cost-benefit analysis can only be relevant in the 
situations where state parties find the vulnerabilities of terrorist organizations.      
 
With regard to deterrence mechanisms, could punishment strategies 
deter in this context if directed against the leadership and members of terrorist 
groups? The key question is whether there are suitable high-value targets that 
could be threatened to make radicals such as bin Laden and his accomplices 
weigh the relative merits of various courses of action. Some argue that it is 
possible to threaten such targets, including family and supporters, and cause 
even the most radical leaders to engage in cost-benefit analysis151. The question 
also arises over symbols of importance to specific terrorists that could be 
threatened as part of a deterrent strategy. For example, what would be the 
equivalent of the World Trade Center to bin Laden? Such approaches are 
difficult to legitimize if pursued overtly by democratically elected governments 
because of political, legal, and ethical constraints. Even if threats were made 
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covertly a target would probably doubt their credibility on the assumption that 
the deterrer is operating under such pressures. Moreover, it is important to 
assess the impact of such threats against the wider goal of reducing the danger 
posed by stateless actors. It could be argued that such threats would increase 
and not reduce the terrorist danger by alienating the deterring party even further 
from the existing and potential target support base. The real challenge in 
determining whether stateless actors like Al-Qaeda are susceptible to 
deterrence logic involves penetrating their black boxes. This means 
understanding the frame of reference of actors, how it is evoked, options 
considered in decision-making, and the lens through which they will perceive 
deterrent messages. Specifically, there must be emphasis on evaluating how 
specific groups or individuals calculate costs and benefits: Are they risk prone 
or risk averse? Do they think in terms of minimizing losses or maximizing 
gains? To what extent are they motivated by survival, security, recognition, 
wealth, power, or success? It will also be critical to assess the processes 
through which suspect organizations make decisions and avoid perceiving the 
capabilities and intentions of such actors as being like one’s own. Addressing 
such questions will require concerted and targeted intelligence collection and 
analysis. 
It is vital to keep in mind the words of Falkenrath. To him, if an 
enemy knows an event can be traced to the perpetrator, it can create “strong 
inhibitions in those that are not personally suicidal.152” 
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CHAPTER - VI 
 
 
APPLICABILTY OF ASYMMETRICAL DETERRENCE 
 
 
 
The last step for the quest of asymmetrical deterrence theory should 
be based on the investigation of its feasibility in terms of applicability which 
depends on rationality, credibility and capability contexts. 
 
The more serious security danger is that emerging from spontaneous 
social violence and from small-scale but highly destructive threats whose 
originating source can not be easily located or identified. The globalizing 
economy is making access to destructive technology inherently available, as 
dramatized but only indirectly illustrated by terrorist episodes in Tokyo and 
Oklahoma City. The proliferation of highly destructive clandestine threats of 
this sort could reach unmanageable proportions. So also could the instances of 
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radical internal disintegration such as have occurred in Bosnia, Somalia, 
Rwanda, Tajikistan, and many other places as well153. 
 
In that context, the determining fact is that any identifiable actor can 
be readily deterred. It is the impersonal process and the actors that can not be 
identified that it is needed to worry about. As a result, the key factor in 
asymmetric deterrence is the sustained efforts to further identify the 
transnational actors.  
 
6.1- “The Threat”: 
 
In referring to the cases to explain theoretical framework, Al-Queda, 
the Aum cult, FARC, Hamas, Hezbollah, PKK (Kongre-Gel) and Chechnyian 
fundamentalists are taken as samples. The foremost reason to consider these 
organizations are their past attempts mentioned earlier, to use NBC material. 
Although their efforts to acquire NBC weapons can be extended over years, as 
particular incidents, only the cases of 2002 set by Center for Non-proliferation 
Studies are considered. In analyzing them, statements made by leaders and 
high-ranked members of organizations and their reactions to the state policies 
are generally measured.  
 
For instance, in the immediate aftermath of the attacks in the 
embassies of U.S., the only effort to retaliate come from Clinton administration 
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was to launch Cruise missiles targeting “sand, dust and mountains except 
terrorists154”. Likewise, the Japanese government could neither locate the 
members of the Aum cult, nor penetrate into its organizational structure155. On 
the other side of the world, Russian intelligence network and special forces 
units could not specify the terrorist cells in the Northern Caucasus in the 1990s 
so as one of the first attempts of perpetrating mass terrorism through 
radioactive material occurred in that region even more, on 14 April 2002 
Chechen rebels reportedly planned to sell poisoned vodka at markets in 
Grozny. The Russian Federal Security Service discovered a container of 
potassium cyanide solution lying next to several bottles of vodka during a 
search of the village of Alkhan-Kala, Chechnya. Analysis of the bottles’ 
contents determined that the potassium cyanide solution had been mixed with 
the vodka156. In that situation how security forces might perceive the 
perpetrators and even the threat before it happens forms the major question and 
indeed the solution to the problem. To continue with Latin American examples, 
FARC rebels poisoned a water treatment plant in the town of Pitalito, Colombia 
on 23 February 2002. The substance, which was not identified, was detected 
during a routine water test. Also several dead FARC insurgents belonging to 
the “Arturo Ruiz” Mobile Column were found in Colombia in possession of 
bullets poisoned with arsenic on 9 March 2002. The bullets matched those 
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found in the Sumapaz area where six wounded soldiers had later died under 
mysterious circumstances. In both cases, statements, made by the authorities 
emphasized on the unidentifiable structure and threat modes of such actions157. 
Moreover, on 27 March 2002, a Hamas suicide bomber detonated an explosive 
in front of the Park Hotel in Netanya, Israel. On June 5, 2002, IDF Major 
General Aharon Zeevi claimed that the terrorists had planned for the bomb also 
to release cyanide gas. Although the bomb did kill 29 Israelis, the attackers 
were unable to install the cyanide to the belt-bomb. They also stated that An 
Najah University in Nablus, and one other laboratory on the West Bank carried 
out the cyanide research. Zeevi claimed that the work was assisted by help from 
Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria, however accepted that such actions could not be 
deterred unless the targets were not specifically determined158.   
 
Interestingly, in all above mentioned cases, those organizations had 
been threatened with different sorts of punishment. Russian authorities 
continuously declared that any unconventional attack from terrorist operations 
will be faced a massive reprisal159. Likewise, in the words of the Israeli 
authorities, retaliation is inevitable for any kind of terrorist attack160. Similarly 
Columbian officers and Defense Minister Pablo Cuerto Moteilas repeatedly 
declared that even though they did not find any terrorists, they would attack 
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with all means to all suitable targets, including families, towns and mountains if 
they will expose a massive NBC attack161. Finally, despite there is an ongoing 
debate in the security community of the U.S. no one thinks about remaining 
stand-by for U.S. in a scenario of a massive NBC attack to its interests and 
citizens162. However, none of these threats seem to work in spite of being made 
before the above mentioned incidents. That is why one of the main concerns of 
the asymmetrical deterrence should be on the identifying specific threats. Of 
course, this will not be enough to deter terrorists. In addition, those targets must 
represent vulnerabilities of those organizations and this will be discussed later.   
 
Only identifiable threats can be threatened by punishment, however 
the concept of targets can be extended instead of being narrowed down to 
members and bases. Apart from military measures, those targets can include the 
audiences of the terrorist organizations. Obviously this does not mean to 
retaliate to the sympathizers but to penetrate into their minds in terms of 
delegitimazing the usage of NBC material. If terrorist aim at influencing 
masses for realizing their objectives, they might be deterred through being 
persuaded not to be backed by that audience. As, Mohammad Salih, one of the 
leading figures of Hamas, stated that “the sole will that motivates our members 
to sacrifice themselves is the belief of Muslims to them that they are fighting 
for not themselves but for the liberation.” Moreover, in the manuscripts of Al-
Queda published in Pakistan in March 2000, it was mentioned that every attack 
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of our enemies to our (innocent) people forms new martyreds for us.163” 
Moreover, in the teaching material of Kongre-Gel (PKK) acquiesced in so-
called Mahzun Korkmaz Academy in the Bekaa Valley in July 1998, the 
possible recruitment areas of the organization were titled as “the ones where 
enemy mainly operates and benefited.164” When it is looked to FARC, the 
commandant of Hollita territory, Jose Santani Marcus (probably a fake name), 
stated in the website of the organization on 23 July 2000 that “if one day we 
perpetrated a massive attack on enemy, it would be inevitable to take the assent 
of our people.” Considering the fact that FARC attempted to undertake small-
scale biological attacks, “the massive attack” should be considered in terms of a 
correlation between audience support and terrorist action. Finally, in the written 
documents of the Aum Cult found in Matsumoto and Tokyo; there were 
matched cities and territories labeled as high, medium and low proportioned 
support. Also, in other teaching materials for members, it is repeatedly 
emphasized on the providing public support for their actions165. Interestingly, 
there are not any clear indicators for undertaking NBC attacks as well as not for 
any evidence that the small and medium ranked cadres were informed from the 
attacks. Nevertheless, like other terrorist organizations which attempted to use 
NBC material, it is clear that they looked for public support for their actions, at 
least for harboring and concealing their capabilities. 
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Nonetheless, mere identification of traditional military targets and 
background support audiences can not be sufficient for asymmetrical 
deterrence. Those terrorist organizations should also be revealed in terms of 
their structures, organizational network and hierarchies. Such a detailed 
information on related groups make easy for states to find vulnerabilities 
thereby to threat them with punishment. In the structure of Al-Queda, for 
instance, it is barely difficult to find leaders or high-ranked members as well as 
specific camps and bases in the vast territories of Afghanistan. That is why 
sending Cruise missiles to the desert and mountains did not avert the 
motivations of Al-Queda to carry out further attacks166. However, recent 
unclassified literature shows that the so-called “flexible intelligence167” strategy 
has provided a noteworthy information to the Israeli security forces on Hamas 
and Hezbollah. This strategy initiated in the eve of the 1990s based on using 
much more unofficial agents and deeper analysis of open-resources created a 
relatively calm phase in the Middle East that as one of the military leaders of 
Hezbollah, Mahram Ali-Ekber Velayeti made a statement in a Lebanese 
newspaper168 on the issue of American presence in the Middle East on 12 
March 2003 that gives clues for the Israeli success on intelligence regarding 
terrorist structures. “We will not retreat –that means withdraw of our soul from 
our body- our will on fighting for liberation of Jerusalem and Holy Lands...we 
will use all means whatever we can obtain and use. We will not be entrapped 
by Americans and Jews as did in the early 1990s. That time we were vulnerable 
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due to recruiting militants regardless of their past and because of interviewing 
with almost every western journalist who wanted to see us. This made us 
heterogeneous organization composed of blabbermouth members. But we 
changed.” However Israeli forces could not apply a limited and selective 
engagement depending upon a healthy intelligence gathering as they can not 
today. Therefore a possible success of deterring Hezbollah seems to be missed 
again. As a result between 1993 and 1996, the Israeli deterrent posture and 
image vis-à-vis the Palestinians eroded, and terrorist attacks did not elicit the 
disproportionate responses necessary to maintain credibility.  
 
Likewise in the second operation of the Russian forces which has 
been more successful than former one in Chechnya, similar intelligence tactics 
have been undertaken in order to reveal the terrorist camps and identify the 
leaders as well as their locations. Despite there were again attacks that created 
mass casualties in Russian homeland, several attempts to use NBC weapons 
and more to undertake conventional terrorism were prevented169.  
 
In all cases, terrorist organizations which are listed as potential users 
of NBC material in terms of past incidents demonstrate a specific but not 
standard organizational structure. The primary aim for deterring NBC usage of 
those terrorists, states need to identify their habitual environment including 
their civilian supporters. As mentioned earlier, in the general logic of the 
deterrence, the threat of punishment could not be functional unless there was no 
one to punish.           
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6.2- Deterring Asymmetrical via Capability and Credibility: 
 
One of the major breaks from classical deterrence is the 
transformation in the desired outcome of the deterrence relationship. Contrary 
to the traditional equilibrium among parties of the Cold War period, that is, 
deterrence would be perfect when all parties were deterred; the best out come 
for asymmetrical deterrence would be unilateral deterrence of terrorist 
organizations by state parties. Thus elements of asymmetrical deterrence are 
considered solely for states to deter stateless rather than a mutual deterrence 
relationship. That is why the absence of credibility can help stabilize a status 
quo, while its presence can precipitate deterrence failure For instance, the lack 
of a usage possibility of a NBC weapon by a terrorist organization helps to the 
maintenance of status quo. 
 
Asymmetrical deterrence theory begins with the argument that mutual 
deterrence works best when state parties have capable and credible threats170. 
Capability means that a threat hurts. Credibility means that a threat rationally 
be believed. Believability is linked to rationality in that threats can be believed 
only when it would be rational to carry them out. Thus, only rational threats can 
be credible. In other words, all players make rational choices at every 
opportunity in a game. In addition, it is important to focus on rough parity 
relationships in which each side’s retaliatory threat is capable of inflicting 
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unacceptable damage on the other side. “Unacceptable” means worse than what 
a state would get by not initiating conflict. In that sense, there are some 
questions to be answered: 
When is deterrence most likely to succeed? 
What is the most important determinant of deterrence success? 
When is deterrence most likely to break down, how will it unravel? 
 
The centrality of the credibility in the deterrence equation lies beneath 
a fundamental and persistent political regularity: the norm of reciprocity. 
Empirical researchers argue that political actors tend to respond- in-kind to one 
another, tit- for-tat, trading amity for friendship and enmity for hostility. Leng 
and Wheeler note the “universality of the norm of reciprocity.171” The available 
empirical evidence suggests that this norm holds across time, across regions, 
across regions, across systems, and across cultures. Consider for example, 
review of the first wave of behavioral research in international politics that 
included inter alia, the analyses of World War I and the Cuban missile crisis, 
and the study of the Middle East from 1949 to 1967, as well as examinations of 
the cold war. Indeed Sullivan found the strongest empirical support for a 
stimulus –response model, leading him to conclude that it is “very likely…that 
other states react in kind to our own actions172”. Moreover, Wilkenfield finds “a 
very high degree of matching behavior” for states involved in an intense 
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crisis173. Numerous other studies detect the same pattern. Summarizing this 
now extensive literature, Cashman concludes that “a large array of scientific 
studies provide evidence to support a stimulus-response theory of international 
conflict…Nations seem to respond to others in the same manner as they are 
treated. Cooperation begets cooperation; hostility begets hostility.174” 
 
However in any asymmetrical relationship including a terrorist 
organization and a state, defining hostility and cooperation is extremely 
difficult. First of all, negotiation is almost impossible due to the illegitimate 
raison d’etre  of terrorist organizations. Also states tend not to give any 
concession- like opportunities to those organizations. This makes the retaliatory 
formulae of political behavior irrelevant to some extend. Nevertheless, there are 
still indirect ways to form an interplay among terrorist organizations and states 
based on pre-defined or declared norms, values and precedence. The case of 
some countries in EU can be again a relevant example. From the beginning of 
the Iraqi operation, France and Germany constantly insisted on an 
internationally and legally legitimized common action towards the problem 
while U.S. and some specific countries in the Union such as Spain and Italy and 
several new member countries in the South Eastern Europe supported a U.S. 
led operation without a clear indication of international legal legitimacy such as 
a precise U.N. Security council Resolution. In that context, when the statements 
of the terrorist organizations related with the conflict in the region analyzed, 
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clearly Germany and France was excluded from the target countries175. In that 
sense, an indirect and relatively positive approach towards an international 
problem seems to be responded by the same relatively cooperative reaction. 
Therefore, if empirical research shows a clear evidence of retaliation in 
political actions among all players in the field, a possible deterrence model 
between asymmetrical actors need to contain somehow a relationship that 
includes (in)direct links in which retaliatory responds can be conveyed. 
Needless to say to do what exactly terrorists want is not the point and the 
desired action. As in the classical deterrence theories, since the asymmetrical 
deterrence can not depend upon categorically equal parties as well as one of the 
parties are considered as illegitimate legally and morally, the model does not 
entail to establish formal connections or to give concessions to the terrorist 
organizations. Instead of directly established connections, states may reshape 
their policy implementations with regard to the terrorist threats besides 
strengthening their defense capabilities for a NBC attack. 
 
In this context, in a extended deterrence relationship, firm-but- flexible 
negotiating styles and tit-for-tat deployments are highly correlated with 
extended deterrence success. This can be defined a firm-but- flexible diplomatic 
stance as a signal that the defender is willing to compromise, but not capitulate. 
Thus, the essence of both a firm-but-flexible bargaining approach and a tit- for-
tat response to an actual provocation is reciprocity, the norm that signals 
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credibility when promised or threatened, and demonstrates it when practiced176. 
From this point of view, for deterring terrorist organizations to use NBC 
weapons, addressing to their so-called rational causes in foreign policy terms 
by state parties is necessary but not sufficient. 
The next step is credibility. In terms of states, the retaliatory 
capability must be demonstrated: As the players’ ordinal rankings of a game’s 
gross outcomes: win, lose, compromise, and conflict. Thus, asymmetrical 
deterrence also involves those four possibilities.  This necessary condition 
helps explain why a show of force is such an important signaling tactic in 
international politics. In addition to augmenting credibility, a demonstration of 
power may help establish threat capability, real or not. Surely such was the 
intention behind the now famous “fly-by” of long-range Bison bombers during 
the June 1955 Aviation Day show in Moscow. Thus, operations in Afghanistan 
and in other countries can be taken as show of capability177. 
 
To continue with, the concept of capability has two dimensions, one 
physical and one psychological. The former aspect concerns the capability to 
execute a threat. Needless to say, a second-strike capacity remains necessary 
for deterrence success178. The latter aspect concerns a potential challenger’s 
cost assessment. If a challenger calculates that bearing the cost of conflict is 
less onerous than suffering the costs of doing nothing, deterrence will always 
fail. As Harvey notes: “Even clear and credible threats from resolute defenders 
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will fail if the challenger believes that the challenge is worth costs incurred by 
triggering the threatened response.179” Such an example is to the point: “The 
problem with the U.S. strategy of putting pressure on North Vietnam was not 
that the threats were not believed, but rather that the North preferred to take the 
punishment rather than stop supporting the war in the South.” NATO’s 
threatened air strike of Serbia in March 1999 is a more recent example. In a 
last-ditch effort to avoid conflict, U.S. special envoy Richard C. Hoolbroke met 
with Former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and asked him: “Are you 
absolutely clear in your own mind what will happen when I get up and walk out 
of this palace?” Hoolbroke reported that Milosevic had replied: “You’re going 
to bomb us.180” 
 
As a result the more burden-capable threats form against the 
opponent, the further success of deterrence occurs in terms of bearing costs. 
Thus, to extend that NBC weapons have an impact on these costs. However, 
contrary to some classical theorists like George Quester181 who argue for an 
overkill capability for success of deterrence, a minimum deterrence deployment 
posture is not only sufficient for but also necessary for asymmetrical deterrence 
in terms of preventing a multilateral assured destruction that can also be the 
ultimate aim of dome terrorist organizations. As found in the documents 
released to the public after the arrestments in Tokyo, some of the scientists 
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working for Aum cult discussed triggering a nuclear war between North Korea 
and Japan thereby with U.S. to shuffle the global stability182. Moreover, in a 
bulk of documents found in the base camps in Afghanistan, allegedly stated 
that Al-Qaeda aimed at catalyzing a dispute between Russia and U.S. through 
perpetrating NBC attacks and putting the blame on Russia in terms of not 
taking necessary security steps for protecting sensitive material. Therefore, they 
might be escalating the conflicts in the Middle East and Northern Caucasus183. 
To impose a qualitatively selective threat can be more deterrent on the basis of 
rationality, compared with demonstrating an overkill capacity that can trigger 
an Armageddon after a relatively low-intensity attack by terrorists. However, 
terrorists may seek to manipulate target states in terms of retaliating to third 
parties through their attacks and/or their strikes can not be definable and visible 
where as victim states can not find any selective targets to retaliate. That is why 
capability in terms of asymmetrical deterrence contains not only the 
procurement of necessary weapons but also confirmed and publicly declared 
targets.  
Nonetheless, a capable retaliatory threat can not be a sufficient 
condition for deterrence success. Moreover, the absence of a capable threat is 
not a necessary condition for general deterrence failure. For the former, the 
case of embassy bombings of U.S. in Tanzania and Kenya can be given. 
Despite Al-Qaeda targets were confirmed at least in Afghanistan by U.S. 
military authorities, they perpetrated the bombings. On the other hand, although 
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there is a lack of global capability in terms of struggling against NBC terrorism 
on the basis of common/global declared retaliatory measures and/or targets 
(sponsored states, terrorist organizations), since the end of the cold war there 
has been no major NBC terrorist attack to the U.S. or any other countries apart 
from attempts and relatively low -scale184 strikes.  
 
Thus, in defining asymmetrical deterrence, the ways force may be 
used, the goals for which force is employed, the strategies developed for 
achieving those goals, and the military means for carrying out such strategies 
are key factors. Recalling the classical deterrence, the broadest distinctions are 
those between the indirect and direct use of force and between the interest in 
preserving or altering the status quo. When a state seeks to achieve its 
objectives by actually employing the military means at its disposal, it is 
engaged in the direct use of force as part of either an offensive strategy (to alter 
the status quo) or a defensive strategy (to preserve the status quo). When a state 
instead seeks to achieve its objectives by influencing the adversary through 
threats to employ the military means at its disposal, it is engaged in the indirect 
use of force as part of either a persuasive strategy to alter, or a dissuasive 
strategy to maintain, the status quo. Such indirect use of force aims to affect the 
behavior of an adversary by indicating the contingency of action, while the 
actual use of military force supporting the policy is held in reserve. In the 
strategic literature, this sort of indirect use of force has normally been discussed 
in debates about the requirements for practicing deterrence and compellence185. 
 
6.3- Deterring Asymmetrical via Strategies: 
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185 Cimbala, Stephen J.; The Past and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence ; (Westport, 
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In terms of strategies that states can apply for asymmetrical deterrence 
following terms can be revisited: 
 
Dissuasion by deterrence threatens to punish the adversary in ways so 
terrifying he dares not initiate challenge, regardless of his ability to actually 
achieve narrow military objectives. Such dissuasion by deterrence may rely on 
nuclear or non-nuclear forces as the means by which the threatened punishment 
would be inflicted. What matters is that the adversary’s decision is swayed by 
the belief that the costs of military action, even technologically successful 
military action are unacceptable. A prospective aggressor certain he can 
accomplish his military objectives, that he will win the war in a technical 
military sense, may yet refrain from initiating action if the anticipated losses (in 
terms of casualties, treasure, or political power) are deemed unacceptably step. 
Aside from the loss of human life and material assets, a country’s leaders may 
worry that prosecuting the war will destabilize the political foundations of their 
rule. Though hard to quantify, the loss of moral authority may result in the 
withdrawal of popular support for a democratic regime or military and elite 
support for an authoritarian regime186. As it is seen in the military intervention 
of U.S. in Iraq; El Sadr, the spiritual leader –thus the political leader due to the 
Shia beliefs- of the Shia population in Iraq, accepted to bargain with U.S. 
forces to ensure the spiritual leadership’s status in Nacaf187. Although there has 
been an ongoing asymmetrical urban guerrilla warfare; the weaker side, which 
depends upon its cause the relative superiority of socio-psychological and 
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cultural values can rationally calculate its losses and profits even though 
seemed as a foe who has nothing to loose likewise other asymmetrical parties 
on the issue of NBC terrorism.  
 
A strategy of dissuasion by defense discourages the adversary from 
challenging the status quo by threatening to confront him with insurmountable 
obstacles to achieving his military objectives. It seeks to convince him he will 
be unable to achieve his goal, regardless of his willingness to absorb 
punishment188. 
 
A state seeking to modify the status quo can pursue this goal through 
the indirect use of force by employing either of two strategies of persuasion. Or 
it may attempt to effect the desired changes through the direct use of force 
married to an offensive strategy. The alternative strategies for persuading an 
adversary to comply with one’s demand for change are compellence and 
offense. Persuasion through compellence seeks to convince the adversary to 
accede to changes in the status quo by relying on threats to inflict unacceptable 
punishment if compliance is not forthcoming. Persuasion through offense seeks 
the adversary’s compliance by threatening to take action that will produce the 
desired changes regardless of the adversary’s efforts to resist.  
 
Besides,  it is widely agreed today that “deterrence” as a term of art 
means preventing war either through fear of punishment or fear of defeat, or 
sometimes even through fear of undefined negative consequences. The word 
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deterrence is derived from the Latin de+terrere , literally “to frighten from” or 
“to frighten away.” Thus, fear is central to the original meaning of 
deterrence189. As a result, the main aim of states for managing asymmetrical 
threats should be creating fear or in Clauswitzian terms, friction against 
stateless foes. In this context, the strategies are crucial. As a mixture of 
classical understandings, following strategies can be applied in terms of 
deterring stateless foes.    
 
Therefore, this confusing tangle of definition problems for the 
concepts of reassurance, compellence, defense, dissuasion, and deterrence and 
instead of such a narrow conceptualization of deterrence as a limited strategy; 
asymmetrical deterrence should cover both direct and indirect use of force as 
well as each strategy regarding status quo. One reason to involve such a broad 
array of strategies lies with the extended categorization of players in the 
asymmetrical deterrence game. Contrary to inter-state relations, the definition 
and determination of non-state actors constitutes a serious problem. As 
mentioned in the first chapter, the terrorist organizations as asymmetrical non-
state actors still can not be commonly conceptualized. As a result, a wide range 
of actors are thought to be in the game. Apart from this, the ongoing 
importance of inter-state relations makes the asymmetrical deterrence to 
subsume the premises of classical deterrence. Thus, only such an extended 
understanding of deterrence is thought to be explanatory for asymmetrical 
relations.  
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To recall the meanings of the “terms of art”, compellence, or perhaps 
coercion or coercive diplomacy, has the positive object of persuading an 
adversary at a minimum to cease and desist from current misbehavior, and 
more likely to retreat from positions seized and to surrender assets illicitly 
seized by force (if the actions in question involve the use of land power, of 
course). Compellence/coercion is not the same as defense. A compellent 
strategy is relevant only after deterrence failed, or was not attempted explicitly. 
It carries the promise to inflict an escalating weight and perhaps character of 
damage, unless our policy demands for the enemy’s retreat are met190. On the 
other hand, some have persuasively argued that the term “dissuasion” should be 
used to refer a broader spectrum of deterring actions than those narrowly 
associated with military deterrence. The word dissuasion derives from the Latin 
“dis+suadere” , “to advise or persuade against”, and is clearly more 
comprehensive in meaning than classical deterrence.  Dissuasion is a current 
American term-of-art, ironically lifted from the French, and it points to the 
aspiration to “dissuade future military competition.191” The DoD Annual 
Report for 2002 was admirably plain in stating the intention of “dissuading 
future military competition.” Secretary Rumsfeld explained that: “ (t)hrough its 
strategy and actions, the U.S. has an influence on the nature of future military 
competitions. U.S. decisions can channel threats in certain directions and 
complicate military planning for potential adversaries in the future. Well-
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targeted strategy and policy can therefore help to dissuade other countries from 
initiating future military competitions.192” To the uncertain degree to which 
dissuasion helps structure respect for, even fear of, American military prowess, 
policy demand for deterrent effect should be reduced. Those dissuaded from 
competing with the super state guardian should not need to be deterred. In that 
context, the concept of deterrence operationally positioned after the failure of 
dissuasion and for preventing to escalate towards compellence. However, in 
terms of terrorism, asymmetrical deterrence should contain both dissuasion and 
compellence in order to better cope with the NBC threat. In fact, terrorism 
refers to an ongoing methodology of using illegitimate violence which 
separates it specific strategic levels. Therefore, deterrence can not be 
considered as prior to compellence because variables in terrorism are not 
constant. Moreover, one can not clearly define the levels of escalation in any 
terrorist intention. A standardized hierarchy among three can not be suited to 
all asymmetrical relationships. This characteristic of asymmetrical deterrence 
will also be mentioned in terms of its issue-specific structure.  
 
In that sense, it is necessary to mention another concept: inducement. 
Compared with classical deterrence, inducement is the flip side of the coin 
from it. Both are strategies for influence, the one with negative sanctions, the 
other with positive. A state may be beyond deterrence, but not beyond 
persuasion-by-reward for good behavior. Readers are invited to consider the 
history of U.S. relations with North Korea over the past decade as a record 
which illustrates almost everything worth knowing about the hazards, and 
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potential benefits, of an inducement strategy193. However, inducement is again 
one of the components of asymmetrical deterrence on the basis of eroding the 
so-called legitimate causes of terrorist organizations to use NBC weapons. For 
instance, assuming a moderate stance in the Middle East Peace Process rather 
than a strict favorable sense for one party, may balance the expectations of the 
international community so as to render obsolete of advocating “desperateness” 
upon which terrorist organizations and their supporters have been depending. 
Preemption and prevention, strictly regarded, are alternatives to deterrence. The 
concept of preemption could hardly be clearer, at least in principle. It means to 
attack first in the last resort, which is to say in the face of truly compelling 
evidence of imminent threat. A preventive attack is intended to strike before an 
identified menace becomes an imminent threat194. Israel’s blow against Iraq’s 
nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1981 was plainly preventive, not preemptive, as 
also was the assault on Iraq in 2003. It scarcely needs to be said that a doctrine 
of preventive assault, particularly in the context of the policy and strategy of 
dissuasion discussed already, invites critics of many stripes to charge the 
United States with being trigger-happy. Again, despite both concepts are 
considered as out of context for classical deterrence; they are “in” for 
asymmetrical one. As mentioned for compellence and dissuasion, the 
unstandardized features of terrorism can make a pre-emptive or preventive 
strategy for one a show of strength or a demonstration of capability and/or 
credibility for another. Basically, they can be used as leverages rather than ends 
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in themselves for an extended and general deterrence which refer to other 
elements of asymmetrical deterrence.  
 
The definition of deterrence is expanding to include more than 
military threats. The author of this paper and those who argue for a more 
expansive definition believe that deterrence should be modified to include all 
instruments of security, not merely the threat of military force. These might 
include nonmilitary sanctions, foreign policy initiatives, economic measures, 
and positive inducements 
In brief, in this paper, the concept of asymmetric deterrence refers to 
the entire field of activities to avert transnational terrorist acts that may be 
perpetrated via WMD.  Within this context, four main strategies may be inter 
alia considered: Dissuasion or persuasion by either direct or indirect use of 
force. In that sense while compellence, inducement, prevention, pre-emption 
and coercion implies deterring the adversary’s will of resistance for 
maintaining status quo, defensive and offensive strategies refer to the 
employing use of force for realizing capabilities. 
 
6.4- Asymmetrical Deterrence: 
 
Generally speaking, deterrence has been marginalized because some 
of the more implacable of our contemporary adversaries appear to be 
undeterrable. Not only are their motivations apparently unreachable by the 
standard kind of menaces, but they lack fixed physical assets for us to threaten. 
Indeed the quests of this paper for an asymmetrical deterrence starts form this 
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criticism. The inimitable Ralph Peters has drawn a most useful distinction 
between “practical” and “apocalyptic” terrorists. The former are people who 
have an agenda that might just be addressed, if not met, as a result of their 
criminal deeds195. For the latter, in Peters’ words, “destruction is an end in 
itself.” He goes on to assert that “(o)ne may be controlled. The other must be 
killed.196” To risk confusing Peters’ admirably sharp distinction, it has to be the 
case that Al-Qaeda, possibly the most potent movement ever committed to 
apocalyptic goals, has been organized (loosely, for security) and administered 
by some extremely competent and practical people. The facts that any 
individual members of al Qaeda would welcome martyrdom, and that the 
organization has non-negotiable goals, are really beside the point. Of course, 
Al-Qaeda cannot be deterred by the prospective death of some of its troops; the 
blood of martyrs will attract new recruits. However, the organization itself, in 
loose-knit sophisticated networked form though it is, should be eminently 
deterrable. While its goals may be apocalyptic, they are goals that can be 
advanced strategically. Al-Qaeda functions strategically and rationally, 
connecting its hideous means purposefully to its other-worldly ends. As this 
analysis insisted earlier, rational behavior need not be reasonable behavior. Al-
Qaeda is not careless of the lives of its soldiers, and still less of the lives of its 
key officers. For Al-Qaeda, death has a purpose. First, it ought to be deterrable 
by a growing conviction that they are failing. It is one thing to die to advance a 
cause. It is quite another to die in an operation that will both probably fail 
tactically, and serve no obvious strategic, albeit apocalyptic, goal. After a 
                                                 
195 Peters, Ralph; Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing World ; (Mechanicsburg, PA: 
Stackpole Books, 2002) pp. 22. 
 
196 Ibid…pp.23. 
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while, the combination of effective counterterrorism and the resistance of the 
world to the impact of martyrdom, including the boredom of over-familiarity, 
should be quite potently deterring. Second, to survive and prosper Al-Qaeda 
has to be careful of the lives of its most important members. Were it otherwise, 
the organization would be out of business in short order. Credible threats to the 
lives of those people, and to their ability to function in command, can have a 
deterring effect. Finally, although Al-Qaeda lacks a central postal address, it 
has cells in 50-70 countries ―a distressing piece of intelligence, indeed and is 
tolerated, and in some cases assisted, by official bodies for their own, distinctly 
non-apocalyptic, reasons. Much of Al-Qaeda’s extra-organizational fellow-
traveling support structure may be deterrable. 
 
At first glance, this infeasibility appears to be the case in mass-
casualty terrorism since the motives of non-state actors to perpetrate such 
attacks are likely to be extreme and their level of resolve so high that deterrence 
is inapplicable. Indeed, groups that contemplate such activity have radical 
views derived from religious (Al-Qaeda) or apocalyptic beliefs (Aum 
Shinrikyo). Moreover, fanaticism is expressed in unrealizable goals, operates 
outside of commonly accepted political and moral norms, and remains 
impervious to negotiation and inducement. For example, Osama bin Laden and 
members of Al-Qaeda claim to be of political, legal, and ethical constraints. 
Even if threats were made covertly a target would probably doubt their 
credibility on the assumption that the deterrer is operating under such pressures. 
Moreover, it is important to assess the impact of such threats against the wider 
goal of reducing the danger posed by non-state actors. It could be argued that 
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such threats acting in the name of Islam in pursuing objectives such as 
eliminating Israel and destroying America. Moreover, it is clear that many 
members of the Al-Qaeda network think in suicidal terms and are willing to 
endure significant costs and destruction in pursuit of their objectives. In the 
mid-1990s, the Aum Shinrikyo sect in Japan sought to cause death, destruction, 
and chaos on such involves demonstrating that the capability exists to ward 
off—or to minimize damage in the event of an attack, thus mitigating the 
desired effects a large scale—through the use of chemical and biological 
weapons— that the resultant disorder and instability would cause the collapse 
of the political and social order. It is vital to distinguish such radical terror 
groups from more traditional organizations such as the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA) and Basque Fatherland and Liberty (commonly known as ETA) that tend 
to attack people or places associated with relatively limited political goals. 
They exercise self- restraint and avoid undermining sympathy for their cause. In 
contrast to Al-Qaeda, they are relatively more open to negotiation. As a result 
they may self deter when it comes to mass-casualty terrorism.  
 
Moreover, credible capabilities for strong denial mechanisms can 
dissuade terrorists from using NBC material and waster their resources. The 
heart of a denial-based approach involves demonstrating that the capability 
exists to ward off—or to minimize damage in the event of—an attack, thus 
mitigating the desired effects of the terrorists. While some requisite denial 
capabilities are applicable to all potential modes of attack, some are mode-
specific. Generic capabilities include using intelligence, diplomatic, military, 
and law enforcement means to locate and interdict non-state actors before they 
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act. For example, developing, bolstering, and refining the core elements of 
counterterrorist strategies could have a generic deterrent effect. The main 
challenge is denial capabilities designed for specific modes of attack. In the 
realm of chemical, biological, and radiological threats, careful preparations for 
consequence management can have a dissuasive or preventive effect. Relevant 
capabilities include the demonstrated readiness of first responders to deal with 
chemical, biological, and radiological incidents. In addition, deterrence can be 
achieved by demonstrating a strong capability for preventing or hindering the 
spread of materials and knowledge non-state actors need to develop and 
produce chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. Relevant capabilities 
include export controls and detecting and interdicting suspect shipments. The 
aim is convincing an enemy that acquiring such weapons is not worth the time, 
resources, and effort required.  
 
On the other hand, a potential negative side effect of denial is the risk 
of it becoming a double- edged sword. Specifically, there is the danger that 
denying or deterring one line of attack will push an opponent to strike against 
less protected areas, possibly using different means—the balloon effect. Other 
modes of attack could be less predictable and more dangerous. Was September 
11 an example of this? If the aim is buying time to frustrate an enemy who is 
strongly committed to alter the status quo, the consequences of succeeding may 
not always be foreseeable and positive. Indeed, short-term success could make 
a target more desperate. This is not to claim that developing a specific denial 
posture should be avoided. But it is essential to consider its negative effects. 
Moreover, the affect of demonstrating capabilities seem to be functional for 
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showing the credibility of deterree. The campaign against the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan was informative because it had a powerful deterrent effect, 
signaling that the United States has the intent, resolve, and ability to punish and 
depose regimes that may contemplate supporting terrorist networks. Prior to the 
events of September 11, it could be argued that the United States had not amply 
demonstrated that. The campaign to unseat the Taliban has made deterrence 
more credible in the context of dissuading regimes from supporting terror 
groups as it can be observed in the case of the Libya’s stance depending upon a 
sort of appeasement. In the words of Mohammad Al-quayri Yasin, the former 
adviser of Qaddafi stated in Al-Ahram that “...if someone would call it 
concession...then be it. The people of Libya did not and will not sacrifice 
themselves for personal desires of some selfish Arabs.197” Although such a 
stance of Libya has exposed a negative reaction recently demonstrated in the 
meetings of the Arab League through the words of Amr Musa, the secretary 
general, Libya may be a relevant example of a working asymmetrical 
deterrence based on an international resolve and coercive actions. As 
subsequently mentioned in this paper, even though asymmetrical deterrence 
subsumes dissuasion, compellence, coercion and inducement because of 
involving a “demonstration affect”, its premises deriving from classical theory 
such as “preventing a specific action before it happens” can be seen. 
Apparently, the inter-state level seems to be relatively more classical in 
asymmetrical deterrence. When state-sponsored ship is in question, 
asymmetrical deterrence can further stem from classical assumptions of 
deterrence. 
                                                 
197 Interview was published on 22 May 2004 in “Al-Ahram.”  
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CHAPTER - VII 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
As the military and political leaders of the Roman Empire understood, 
in a hostile and anarchic world, in order to preserve the peace, it is often 
necessary to prepare for war (Qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum ). The 
promise of unacceptable consequences and retaliation following an attack may 
not be politically correct, but in the face of deep-seated hatred and hostility, 
there is often no realistic alternative. Deterrence, on its own, is not always 
sufficient to prevent conflict, but it is still a necessary condition for creating 
and maintaining stability.  
Before commencing concluding remarks, it is useful to recall the basic 
parameters of asymmetrical deterrence in a table format: 
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Table 3: Basic Breaks 
 
CLASSICAL / 
SYMMETRIC 
ASYMMETRIC 
Minor actors make 
marginal military 
contribution.  
Relatively weaker actors have major 
effective capabilities 
Minor actors as allies can 
try to exploit the 
interdependence of 
superpowers.  
Major actors cannot remain 
independent against all parties in terms 
of NBC usage. 
Maintaining status quo is 
vital for all parties 
Some aims at revision.  
Deterrence can be mostly 
formed in terms of indirect 
use of force for dissuasion.  
Deterrence via direct use of force for 
preservation or/and alteration is 
possible. 
“The latent violence” or 
“the diplomatic violence” 
is means. 
Direct violence is leverage. 
M.A.D. and pyrrhic 
victories are possible. 
Multi dimensional destruction and 
pyrrhic victories are possible. 
Mainly nuclear deterrence Presence of CBRN deterrence 
Standardized inventory 
protocols for delivery 
systems, warheads, threat-
response strategies and 
tactics. 
Non-standardized rules of engagement.  
Maximum strategic 
interdependence 
Minimum strategic interdependence 
Deterrence (in narrow 
terms) rather than 
compellence 
Compellence rather than deterrence (in 
narrow terms). 
Limited actors with first-
strike uncertainty. 
Non-limited actors with first-strike 
uncertainty. 
Controllable nuclear 
escalation. 
Non-controllable nuclear escalation. 
Minimum usage of BC 
weapons (possibility) 
Maximum usage of BC weapons 
(possibility) 
“Threat that leaves 
something to chance” 
“ Threat that leaves more than 
something to chance” 
Definable actors and units Non-definable actors and units 
Mutual deterrence is the 
desired outcome 
Unilateral deterrence is the desired 
outcome.  
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Table 4: Basic Continuities  
 
Concerned cost-effectiveness. In spite of increased level, 
there is concerned cost-
effectiveness. 
Rational ends via mostly rational means. Rational ends via either 
rational or irrational means. 
Bipolarity with anarchic system. Although the polarity may 
change, its ordering 
principle (anarchic system) 
will not. 
Nuclear weapons (NW) are the subject 
matter. 
Although RMA and CRB 
are relevant, revolutionary 
consequences of NW can 
not be disregarded yet. 
Efficient communication and information 
based decision-making. 
Take decisions via effective 
information gathering and 
communication. 
 
 
Toward the end of the Cold War, deterrence, and terms such as 
"massive retaliation" and "assured destruction," lost respectability and became 
politically incorrect. The idea that the survival of the United States and Europe 
depended on threats to destroy dozens of Soviet cities in retaliation for a 
nuclear attack, was seen by many as immoral and not credible. Ronald 
Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative reflected the efforts to replace deterrence 
with an alternative strategy based on defensive umbrellas. 
 
The rejection of deterrence was reinforced following the end of the 
Cold War, and this strategy has been largely neglected, both in confronting the 
so-called state-terrorism of Saddam Hussein, and also in response to threats 
from non-state terrorists such as Osama bin Laden (as well as the regime(s) that 
give them sanctuary). In 1990, by failing to clearly and credibly communicate 
the consequences of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. allowed Saddam 
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Hussein to believe that he could get away with annexation. Moreover, either 
some scholars argue about the lack of capabilities of terrorists or advocate the 
infeasibility of their NBC weapons usage. However, the incidents and 
unclassified literature say us that even though it is not a probability, it is a 
possibility. 
 
In the confrontation against "asymmetric warfare," the role of 
deterrence has been largely neglected. In part, this reflects the continuation of 
the distaste for policies based on retaliation and the use of hostages, but it is 
also the result of the mistaken belief that terrorists such as bin Laden and 
members of groups such as Hamas, Hizbullah, FARC, Aum, which are suicidal 
and/or apocalyptic and/or politically desperate to use NBC weapons cannot be 
deterred. After the mass terror attacks on New York and Washington, and given 
the difficulties inherent in alternative strategies based on defense and pursuit of 
such elusive and invisible enemies, it is necessary to introduce concepts based 
on deterrence and assured destruction as well. 
 
Within this context, first of all, the area where deterrence can be most 
effective is with respect to states and regimes that give safe-havens and support 
to terrorist organizations. Ultimately, the world is divided into states, and all 
terrorist groups need territory from which to operate, controlled by states. 
Indeed, UN Security Council Resolution 1373, adopted on September 28, 2001, 
focuses on state responsibility in refraining from "providing any form of 
support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts." It is 
certainly preferable for the U.S. and the UK to persuade states to patrol their 
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own territories rather than to deploy overextended American and British forces 
all over the globe in order to find terrorist cells. Thus, even in cases of non-
state terrorism, the chain of responsibility may lead to identifiable and 
vulnerable regimes and political leaders that can be deterred by threatening 
their own survival. Had the costs of hosting Al-Qaeda been made clear to the 
leaders of the Taliban over the past few years, they would have acted to evict 
bin Laden and his Arab brigade from Afghanistan. Now, of course, the price 
has become clear, but it is too late for deterrence, and this thesis discussed basic 
premises for such deterrence. 
 
Secondly, the identification of the threat and prevention of ill-defined 
targets are musts for initiating a deterrence policy against stateless actors. In 
that sense, the mere task of the state parties is to reveal the vulnerabilities of 
terrorist organizations in order to organize their reaction as retaliation. 
 
Thirdly, the deterrent threat of punishment should be coded in a 
declaratory and clearly understandable way that will entail targeting the foe 
through the potential of its losses and costs. Needless to say, to dissuade 
identified adversary, precise threats should be made against its vulnerabilities 
in which it rationally prefers not to act. In those terms, the concept of 
rationality subsumes the traditional rational person of classical deterrence and 
extends its logic towards not only a fragmented but also a non-monolithic 
environment. That is called relative rationality. In order to better opt for 
successful deterrence policies, state parties should penetrate the black boxes of 
stateless actors and determine the process of decision-making in terms of 
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different point of views between decision-takers and action-takers, their 
motives; and legitimacy basis. Indeed, we are urgently in need of culturally 
sophisticated profiles of asymmetric foes, so that we may stand some chance of 
understanding what might best discourage them from proceeding.  
 
And lastly, credible capabilities should be created for struggling 
asymmetrical terrorism. They can be either for denial or pre-empt; they can aim 
both prevent and compel and they can involve inducement. The most vital is to 
consider every threat as unique. And like in the aforementioned phases, 
capabilities can only be credible if they are organized on the basis of issue-
specific manner. A state can not attack with conventional forces for pre-
empting a threat in a case similar to Aum cult; or a state may consider and 
declare as dissuasion, using high- intensity weapons in the situations where a 
state would be proved to be the backer of a terrorist attack via NBC weapons. 
In brief, relativity is not only the guiding principle of rationality; it is also the 
ordering principle of forming credible capability.  
 
In conclusion, the introductory principles of asymmetrical deterrence 
might be formulated as follows: 
For a possible asymmetrical deterrence to be successful, there is a 
need for credibility for capable retaliatory measures that also involves 
demonstrative effects from which rational but might be reasonabless foes can 
be dissuaded, compelled, prevented, pre-empted and/or coerced multi-
dimensionally through applicable multi- faceted means including (in)direct use 
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of force and/or non-military policies based upon well-communicated and 
openly declared multi- lateral implementations.  
 
In this respect, this thesis tried to argue that it is irrelevant to ask the 
question whether states will react or not. Instead the question should be based 
on the following clause: if reaction is inevitable, it will occur in which terms. 
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